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JURISDICTION
This is an appeal from the grant of the trial court (Honorable John R.
Anderson of the Eighth Judicial District Court in and for Duchesne County,
Roosevelt Division, State of Utah (the "Trial Court")) of a post-remand
summary judgment and final judgment. This Court has jurisdiction to
decide this appeal pursuant to

UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 78-2a-3.

STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
(a) Did the Trial Court err in not construing the limited facts
available to it in the light most favorable to Leo W. Hardy, M.D. ("Dr.
Hardy") as the nonmoving party?
(b) Did the Trial Court err in not allowing the jury to determine the
reasonableness of the duration of the contract?
(c) Did the Trial Court err in not allowing additional discovery to
develop the record so the scope of the "just clause" provision could be fairly
determined?
(d) Did the Trial Court err in not allowing the jury to determine
whether or not Uintah Basin Medical Center ("UBMC") had "just cause" to
terminate Dr. Hardy?
Standard of Review: The Trial Court's application of law to the
undisputed facts in summary judgment is reviewed for correctness. Trujillo
2

v. Utah Dep't. of Tramp., 1999 UT App 227, \\2, 986 P.2d 752. Further,
"[i]n reviewing a grant of summary judgment, [ ] the facts and all
reasonable inferences drawn therefrom" are viewed "in the light most
favorable to the nonmoving party." Surety Underwriters v. E & C Trucking,
Inc., 2000 UT 71,1J15, 10 P.3d 338.
DETERMINATIVE LAW
The decision in this appeal is governed by common law and thus no
statutes, constitutional provisions, ordinances, or rules are determinative.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case, Course of Proceeding, and Disposition Below
This is a breach of contract case involving a professional services
contract for pathology services (the "Agreement") entered into by Dr. Hardy
and UBMC. 1 The Agreement, executed on November 29, 1994, recited no
termination date, but instead was terminable "for just cause." Dr. Hardy
performed under the Agreement to the complete satisfaction of all
concerned, i.e., doctors, patients, medical staff, and UBMC administration.
No member of the UBMC administration or medical staff ever expressed
any concern whatsoever over Dr. Hardy's performance between November

1

A true and correct copy of Dr. Hardy's contract is included in the
Addendum as Exhibit "A".
3

of 1994 and July of 1996 UBMC terminated the Agreement on July 18,
1996.
In the spring of 1996, Dr. Thomas J. Allred ("Dr. Allred") contacted
UBMC to inquire whether UBMC would be interested in hiring a full time
pathologist who was also certified as an emergency room physician. UBMC
invited Dr. Allred to visit the hospital and shortly thereafter, on July 18,
1996, the UBMC Board of Trustees ("the "Board") voted to terminate Dr.
Hardy's contract and to offer Dr. Allred a position as director of pathology
and part-time emergency room physician.
UBMC gave Dr. Hardy 90 days written notice of termination on July
29, 1996, without giving any reason in the letter for terminating the
Agreement. When Dr. Hardy objected that UBMC did not have just cause to
terminate the Agreement, UBMC filed a declaratory judgment action
seeking to determine the parties' rights under the Agreement. The parties
filed-cross motions for summary judgment on Dr. Hardy's breach of
contract claim, which were both denied on October 19, 1998. After the
completion of discovery, the parties agreed to stipulated facts and refiled
motions for summary judgment on the legal question of whether Dr. Hardy's
"just cause" contract was enforceable under Utah law.

4

The Trial Court heard oral arguments on the renewed motions for
summary judgment and ruled from the bench that Dr. Hardy's "just cause"
contract was enforceable under Utah law, and the question of whether
UBMC had just cause to terminate the Agreement was for the jury to decide
as a question of fact. The Trial Court then allowed the parties to file
additional briefs on the issue of whether successor UBMC boards could be
bound by the Agreement or whether the Agreement was voidable by a
successor board. On April 6, 2000, the Trial Court ruled that the Agreement
could not be enforced against UBMC's successor Boards. The Trial Court
further ruled that because the eleven-member Board in place when the
Agreement was terminated had three new members, it was a successor
Board and hence it could terminate the Agreement at any time. On that
basis, the Trial Court denied Dr. Hardy's renewed motion for summary
judgment and granted summary judgment in favor of UBMC.
On June 1, 2000, Dr. Hardy filed a Notice of Appeal, thereby
appealing the Trial Court's order and judgment granting Plaintiffs Motion
for Summary Judgment entered on May 18, 2000. On August 30, 2002, the
Utah Supreme Court issued an opinion holding that because the contract
involved a proprietary function, it was enforceable against successor boards
if the contract was for a reasonable duration. See Uintah Basin Med. Ctr. v.

5

Hardy, 2002 UT 92, 1J18, 54 P.3d 1165, a copy of which is included in the
Addendum as Exhibit "B". The Utah Supreme Court remanded the case
back to the Trial Court instructing the court to develop the record and to
determine the scope of the "just cause" provision.
On February 18, 2003, UBMC filed its Post Remand Motion for
Summary Judgment, or in the Alternative, Motion to Bifurcate. On April
15, 2003, Dr. Hardy filed his Opposition to the Post Remand Motion for
Summary Judgment, requesting, inter alia, that additional discovery be
taken in order to develop the record pursuant to the Supreme Court's
direction on remand. The Trial Court did not allow additional discovery and
granted UBMC's Post Remand Motion for Summary Judgment by Ruling
dated June 12, 2003 (the "Ruling"). 2 See R. 1624-26, in which the Court
held that the contract "cannot be viewed as including a reasonable
duration." (R. 1625). The Court also concluded that "the intended scope of
the just cause clause provided limited discretion to future boards, and is
unusual when comparing Dr. Hardy's contract to other contracts typically
entered into by Uintah Basin Medical Center with other medical
professionals, and as such the contracts duration was unreasonable making
the contract unenforceable, . ." (R. 1625).
A true and correct copy of the Ruling is included in the Addendum as
Exhibit "C".
6

The Trial Court made its decision based on no additional discovery,
even though Dr. Hardy requested additional depositions, and the Utah
Supreme Court ordered development of the record. Dr. Hardy did, however,
submit a declaration regarding his understanding of the "just cause"
provision in compliance with the Utah Supreme Court's opinion. See R. at
1546.3 The Trial Court dismissed Dr. Hardy's declaration as self-serving,
not as an attempt to develop the record as ordered by the Utah Supreme
Court. In addition, the Trial Court did not allow the taking of Dr. Wayne T.
Stewart's ("Dr. Stewart") deposition, another physician at UBMC whose
contract terms closely mirrored Dr. Hardy's. The Trial Court simply
dismissed this contract as "atypical." Notwithstanding, the Trial Court
opined that "when comparing Dr. Hardy's contract to other medical
professionals typically entered into by Uintah Basin Medical Center, the
vast majority of those contracts provide a specific duration, and a provision
allowing either party to terminate the contract after giving the appropriate
notice." (R. 1624-25). Dr. Hardy was not allowed to conduct discovery in
an effort to explain the reasons for the language in his contract. The Trial
Court's refusal to allow additional discovery is in complete disregard of the
Utah Supreme Court's directive to the Trial Court to develop the record.
3

A true and correct copy of Dr. Hardy's declaration is included in the
Addendum as Exhibit "D".
7

On July 31, 2003, Dr. Hardy, by and through his counsel, filed a
Notice of Appeal from the final judgment dated July 10, 2003 of the
Honorable John R. Anderson, Eighth Judicial District Court of Duchesne
County, Roosevelt Division. 4
Statement of Facts
1. Dr. Hardy is a board certified pathologist. (R. 189).
2. UBMC is the business name for Duchesne County Hospital, which
is owned by Duchesne County and operated by UBMC's Board of Trustees.
(R. 304).
3. On November 29, 1994, Dr. Hardy and UBMC entered into the
Agreement in which Dr. Hardy agreed to provide professional services for
UBMC as director of the hospital's pathology laboratory and to perform
related duties. The language of the Agreement was taken from a contract
between UBMC and Dr. Joseph J. Sannella ("Dr. Sannella")(a pathologist at
UBMC who immediately preceded Dr. Hardy). Dr. Hardy modified the
contract slightly and returned the edited contract to UBMC. The Agreement
was then typed onto Duchesne County Hospital letterhead and signed by
Bradley D. LeBaron, who was UBMC's administrator and who had authority
to enter into personal service contracts on UBMC's behalf. Although the
A true and correct copy of the Judgment is included in the Addendum as
Exhibit "E".
8

Agreement was executed on November 29, 1994, it became effective August
1, 1994, the date upon which Dr. Hardy first began providing pathology
services to UBMC. (R. 185-86, 189, 546).
4. Paragraph 11 of the Agreement provides:
This agreement shall become effective August 1,
1994 and continue to bind the parties to the terms
hereof until terminated after ninety (90) days written
notice for just cause of termination by either party or
by mutual consent of the parties to a shorter notice
period.
(R. 185-86, 546).
5. Pursuant to the terms of the Agreement, Dr. Hardy agreed to (a) be
available for physician consults to interpret laboratory results; (b) visit the
UBMC hospital weekly for one to two hours to recommend processes and
policies to assure smooth operation of the UBMC laboratory, and (c)
undertake teaching activities when new procedures were introduced. (R.
185-86).
6. The Board is the entity authorized to terminate personal services
contracts. (R. 546).
7. Pursuant to the Bylaws, the Board can terminate membership on
the medical staff:
u

for any purpose reasonably related to the delivery
of quality patient care services, including but not
limited to:

9

(a) The Hospital's ability to provide services related
to a medical specialty or sub-specialty;
(b) The Hospital's patient load;
(c) The determination that granting Medical Staff
membership is inconsistent with the mission, role
and purpose of the Hospital;
(d) The Failure of the practitioner to comply with
the terms of the Hospital or Medical Staff Bylaws,
rules and regulations;
(e) Any other reason specified in these or the
Medical Staff Bylaws or others not specified which
are reasonably related to the delivery of quality
patient care.
(R. 994).
8. On July 18, 1996, the Board voted to terminate the Agreement and
to invite Dr. Allred to join UBMC's medical staff as a pathologist and as an
emergency room physician. (R. 290A, 290-91, 304, 545).
9. Dr. Hardy continued working for UBMC until October 28, 1996,
approximately 90 days after UBMC notified him it was terminating the
Agreement. (R. 189, 545).
10. Prior to his termination, Dr. Hardy performed his obligations
under the Agreement satisfactorily and received no complaints whatsoever
from UBMC or its medical staff. After termination of the Agreement, on a
few occasions, at the request of members of the UBMC medical staff, and
with the approval of the UBMC administration, Dr. Hardy performed

10

limited pathology services for members of the UBMC medical staff in Dr.
Allred's absence. (R. 189, 545).
11. Dr. Joseph J. Sannella was the pathologist who preceded Dr.
Hardy and his contract had language identical to Dr. Hardy's stating that the
contract would "continue to bind the parties to the terms [ ] until after
ninety (90) days written notice for just cause of termination by either party
or by mutual consent of the parties to a shorter notice period." (R. 1538).
A true and correct copy of Dr. Sannella's contract is included in the
Addendum as Exhibit "F".
12. Dr. Wayne T. Stewart was a radiologist at UBMC and his contract
provided for termination only "(a) for the loss of a licence [sic] to practice
in the State of Utah, or; (b) for the conviction of a felony, or; (c) by the
mutual consent of both parties." (R. 1458). A true and correct copy of Dr.
Stewart's contract is included in the Addendum as Exhibit "G".
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The Trial Court erred in not construing the facts available to it in the
light most favorable to Dr. Hardy as the nonmoving party. Utah law is clear
that "[a] trial court is not authorized to weigh facts in deciding a summary
judgment motion, but is only to determine whether a dispute of material fact
exists,..." Pigs Gun Club, Inc. v. Sanpete County, 2002 UT 17, ^|24, 42 P.3d

11

379. 5 Dr. Hardy presented ample evidence, even without developing the
record as directed by the Supreme Court, to create a genuine issue of
material fact upon which reasonable minds could differ. For instance, the
very fact that UBMC entered into other contracts terminable for "just cause"
is sufficient evidence that Dr. Hardy's was not the first such contract, and
that there was a precedent for contracts with "just cause" termination
clauses. The Trial Court completely ignored these contracts which evidence
UBMC's history of entering into contracts terminable for cause, and made a
factual determination as to the type of contracts "typically" entered into by
UBMC. The trier of fact, a jury in this case, is the proper party to determine
what weight is to be given the contracts proffered by Dr. Hardy, not the
Trial Court at the summary judgment stage.
The Trial Court exceeded its authority in granting UBMC's motion for
summary judgment, completely disregarding the purpose of summary
judgment. Utah law is clear that:
It is not the purpose of the summary judgment
procedure to judge the credibility of the averments
of parties, or witnesses, or the weight of evidence.
Nor is it to deny parties the right to a trial to resolve
disputed issues of fact. Its purpose is to eliminate
5

See also Draper City v. Estate of Bernardo, 888 P.2d 1097 (Utah 1995)
where the Court stated that "[o]n a motion for summary judgment, a trial
court should not weigh disputed evidence, and its sole inquiry should be
whether material issues of fact exist." Id. at 1100.
12

the time, trouble and expense of trial when upon any
view taken of the facts as asserted by the party ruled
against, he would not be entitled to prevail. Only
when it so appears, is the court justified in refusing
such a party the opportunity of presenting his
evidence and attempting to persuade the fact trier to
his views. Conversely, if there is any dispute as to
any issue, material to the settlement of the
controversy, the summary judgment should not be
granted.
Holbrook Co. v. Adams, 542 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 1975). Because the Trial
Court made credibility determinations and ignored disputed issues of fact
favoring Dr. Hardy, the Trial Court's granting of UBMC's post-remand
motion for summary judgment should be reversed.
The Trial Court erred in not allowing additional discovery to develop
the record so the scope of the "just cause" provision in Dr. Hardy's contract
could be fairly determined. The Utah Supreme Court remanded the case "to
permit the district court to allow further development of the record ..."
Uintah Basin, 2002 UT 92 at ^[18. Further, the Court suggested that it might
be "useful to compare Dr. Hardy's contract to the agreements UBMC
typically enters into with medical professionals." Id. at f 18. The Trial
Court did not allow development of the record and dismissed evidence of
other contracts with similar termination provisions. In this case, the Trial
Court assumed the role of fact-finder without allowing additional discovery
as directed by the Supreme Court.

13

The Trial Court erred in not allowing the jury to determine the
reasonableness of the duration of Dr. Hardy's contract. On summary
judgment, Judge Anderson must look at the evidence before him and
determine whether there is enough evidence to proceed to trial A
determination about reasonableness that includes weighing the evidence,
and the credibility assigned to that evidence, should not take place at the
summary judgment stage, but is left for the jury to decide at trial. In Uintah
Basin, the Utah Supreme Court used the term "trial court" liberally, but did
not mean that the Court was to determine all of the issues. The Trial Court
was to make only the initial determination of whether reasonable evidence
existed to support Dr. Hardy's theory of the case. Historically, there are
defined roles of judge and jury that need to be upheld. Questions of weight
and credibility are jury questions, while questions of law are for the Court to
decide.
It is a well-settled contract law principle that the jury evaluates
reasonableness of duration. See Green v. Oliver Realty, Inc., 526 A.2d
1192, 1202-03 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1987); see also Stutzke v. D.G.C. Liquidation
Co., 533 So.2d 897, 899 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988); Burger ChefSyst. Inc. v.
Burger Chef of Fla., Inc. 317 So.2d 795,798 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975).

14

There is currently no Utah case law addressing this aspect of a jury's duty,
and, therefore, this Court should clarify Utah law on this issue.
Finally, the Trial Court erred in not allowing the jury to determine
whether or not UBMC had "just cause" to terminate Dr. Hardy. Clearly
defined roles of judge and jury are important, especially in situations where
there are mixed questions of law and fact. Dr. Hardy has a right to have the
jury determine not only the reasonableness of the contract duration, but
whether or not UBMC had just cause to terminate him. The Trial Court
overstepped its bounds by making these and other determinations on
summary judgment (even after ruling that the question of whether UBMC
had just cause to terminate the Agreement was for the jury to decide as a
question of fact). See R. 737 & 1055. This Court should more clearly
delineate the roles of judge and jury, specifically in the area of contract
interpretation and application.
ARGUMENT

I.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT CONSTRUING THE
FACTS AVAILABLE TO IT IN THE LIGHT MOST
FAVORABLE TO DR. HARDY AS THE NONMOVING PARTY.
It is well-settled that on summary judgment, a judge is charged with

reviewing the evidence presented, construing that evidence in the light most
favorable to the nonmoving party, and determining whether reasonable

15

minds could differ as to the evidence and inferences drawn therefrom.
Summary judgment is meant to "weed out" cases that are so devoid of
evidence that no reasonable person could find in favor of the nonmoving
party. 7 In this instance, the Trial Court was asked to make a threshold
determination of whether the just cause provision created an unreasonable
time duration for Dr. Hardy's contract. Stated somewhat differently, the
Trial Court was directed to analyze whether a reasonable person could
interpret the pertinent facts in such a way that made the durational element
of Dr. Hardy's Agreement (i.e., the occurrence of "just cause") appear
reasonable. If there were sufficient facts that might lead a reasonable
person to find the contract reasonable (at least with respect to the
circumstances under which it could be terminated), then the Trial Court's

See Mountain States Tele. & Tele. Co. v. Atkin, Wright & Miles,
Chartered, 681 P.2d 1258, 1261 (Utah 1984).
7

See Crawford-el v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 600 (1998) where the Court
stated that:
summary judgment serves as the ultimate screen to
weed out truly insubstantial lawsuits prior to trial.
At that stage, if the defendant-official has made a
properly supported motion, the plaintiff may not
respond simply with general attacks upon the
defendant's credibility, but rather must identify
affirmative evidence from which a jury could find
that the plaintiff has carried his or her burden of
proving the pertinent motive.

16

job was done and it needed to deny the motion for summary judgment and
give the case to the jury (i.e., the trier of fact). If there was no possible way
that a reasonable person could interpret the durational element as
reasonable, then the Trial Court was obligated to grant the summary
judgment motion and take the case away from the jury.
In making that threshold determination, the universal directive to the
Trial Court is that the facts must (without exception) be construed in favor
of the nonmoving party, i.e., Dr. Hardy. There is no weighing or assessing
the facts - the facts as presented by the non-movant are accepted as true. In
this case (albeit without the benefit of additional discovery), Dr. Hardy
presented the Trial Court with two other contracts without specific time
limits. That fact alone should have been sufficient to find the just cause
provision reasonable. That is, UBMC had found that the practice of
ensuring a doctor's contract would continue (except, for example, in the
instance of professional malfeasance on the part of the doctor or an
extraordinary change in the circumstances of the hospital) until just cause
occurred was in the best interest of the hospital. The Utah Supreme Court
asked the Trial Court to develop the record as to what those benefits might
be (e.g., attraction and retention of specialist that might not otherwise
practice in a rural hospital such as UBMC) and to explore the downside to

17

such contracts. The Utah Supreme Court asked the Trial Court to take
evidence of any other factors that might bear on the reasonableness of the
contract term, which might include a more detailed examination of what the
Board of Trustees intended when they approved Dr. Hardy's contract, why
Dr. Hardy's contract differed from the other contracts with time limits, why
UBMC would continue with Dr. Stewart's contract (which is devoid of a
specific time limit) when the hospital was arguing in this litigation that such
a contract was unreasonable. In essence, the Utah Supreme Court asked the
Trial Court to survey the entire evidentiary landscape upon which Dr.
Hardy's Agreement would be assessed and decide whether a reasonable
person could somehow interpret the facts as advanced by Dr. Hardy were
reasonable in any plausible way.
The Trial Court misinterpreted the instructions of the Utah Supreme
Court and mistakenly thought that the appellate court was asking the Trial
Court to do something more than just the threshold inquiry that is required
in a summary judgment setting. The Trial Court did not ask whether the
facts as presented by Dr. Hardy were reasonable, but rather jumped into the
realm of assessing and judging those facts for itself. The most glaring
example of the erroneous path taken by the Trial Court was its categorical
rejection of the two other contracts without specific time limits - Drs.

18

Sannella and Stewart's contracts. The Trial Court should have looked at
those contracts and determined that Dr. Hardy's Agreement was not
aberrational. If it was reasonable for UBMC to honor Dr. Stewart's contract
even while disputing the reasonableness of Dr. Hardy's contract, it is
certainly reasonable to think that UBMC saw value in such contracts.
The assessments made by the Trial Court were well beyond the scope
of the assignment given the Trial Court in the context of a summary
judgment. In order to survive summary judgment, Dr. Hardy "need only
present evidence from which a jury might return a verdict in his favor. If he
does so, there is a genuine issue of fact that requires a trial." Anderson v.
Liberty Lobby, Inc., All U.S. 242, 257 (1986)(emphasis added). 8 Finally,
the United States Supreme Court has held that "the issue of fact must be
'genuine." and that the nonmoving party "must do more than simply show
that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts."

Matsushita

Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). In
this case, Dr. Hardy has presented more than enough genuine evidence, even

The Court in Liberty Lobby also stated that u [t]he inquiry performed is the
threshold inquiry of determining whether there is the need for a trial—
whether, in other words, there are any genuine factual issues that properly
can be resolved only by a finder of fact because they may reasonably be
resolved in favor of either party." Id. at 250.
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without further development of the record, on which reasonable minds could
differ as to the evidence and inferences drawn.
A.

The Trial Court Infringed on the Jury's Duty By Weighing
the Evidence and Determining Reasonableness of Duration,

On remand, the Trial Court was charged with developing the record in
order that a jury could determine reasonableness. Instead, the Trial Court
determined reasonableness from the evidence before it. While it was
necessary for Judge Anderson to review the facts before him, it was for the
limited purpose of determining whether there was enough evidence to go to
trial, all the while viewing the facts in the light most favorable to Dr. Hardy,
not for him to weigh the evidence at the summary judgment stage, and to
make a determination of reasonableness. 9
It is clear from the Ruling that the Trial Court did not construe the
facts available to it in the light most favorable to Dr. Hardy. Without even
considering additional evidence, the Trial Court determined that the scope
of the "just cause" provision is narrow and the duration is unreasonable.
The Utah Supreme Court's references to the evidence before the Court
without further development of the record in the Uintah Basin decision
alone are sufficient to raise a genuine issue of material fact where
9

See Liberty Lobby, All U.S. at 255 where the Court held that "[credibility
determinations, the weighing of the evidence, and the drawing of legitimate
inferences from the facts are jury functions, not those of a judge,..."
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reasonable minds could differ. For instance, the Utah Supreme Court noted
that UBMC's bylaws appear to be quite broad based on the power given to
the Board of Trustees to terminate medical staff. See Uintah Basin, 2002
UT 92 at | 1 8 , note 4. The Trial Court completely disregarded this and all
other facts favoring Dr. Hardy, adopting wholeheartedly UBMC's recitation
of the facts and inferences drawn therefrom.
Dr. Hardy's pleadings are replete with facts proving that his contract
with UBMC was reasonable in light of the circumstances of his practice and
the rural nature of the hospital and community. At the very least,
reasonable minds could differ on the interpretation of the facts regarding the
reasonableness of the contract's duration and "just cause" issues, and,
therefore, Judge Anderson's grant of summary judgment should be reversed.
B.

The Trial Court Did Not View Evidence of the Other
Contracts in a Light Most Favorable to Dr. Hardy.

The Trial Court erred when it made a determination that Dr. Hardy's
contract was unreasonable when compared to contracts UBMC entered into
with other physicians. The Court ignored Drs. Sannella and Stewart's
contracts, neither of which includes a duration. See R. at 1460 & 1539.
Although the Utah Supreme Court suggested that a review of other contracts
would be useful in determining the scope of the "just cause" provision, the
Trial Court infringed on the jury's role when it chose to ignore other factors.
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Further, the Trial Court cannot make a determination as to the significance
of Drs. Sannella's and Stewart's contracts vis a vis Dr. Hardy's contract. At
this stage, the Court should simply have reviewed the contracts presented to
it and construed those contracts in a light most favorable to Dr. Hardy to
determine whether reasonable minds could differ on the interpretation and
application of those contracts to Dr. Hardy's. Reasonable minds could
easily differ on the interpretation and application of those contracts to Dr.
Hardy's, and a jury could find in Dr. Hardy's favor that the duration of his
contract was appropriate to meet the needs of UBMC.
At least two, and maybe more, of UBMC's previous contracts contain
provisions either identical or similar to Dr. Hardy's "just cause" provision,
and do not specify a duration. The jury should determine whether these two
contracts, and perhaps others not yet discovered, are sufficient evidence to
prove that Dr. Hardy's contract is, in fact, reasonable.
The Trial Court also ignored UBMC's bylaws which, as noted by the
Utah Supreme Court, "suggest that UBMC routinely enters into agreements
under which the only practical durational limit is a liberally-construed 'just
cause' provision." Uintah Basin, 2002 UT 92 at ^fl8, note 4. Although it is
not necessary to survive summary judgment, at the very least, Dr. Hardy
should be allowed to conduct additional discovery in order to develop the
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record on this issue, including a survey of all contracts that UBMC had with
other doctors at the time Dr. Hardy's contract was entered into (i.e., 1994).

II. DR. HARDY SHOULD BE ALLOWED TO CONDUCT
ADDITIONAL DISCOVERY IN ORDER TO DEVELOP THE
RECORD SO THAT THE SCOPE AND REASONABLENESS OF
THE JUST CAUSE PROVISION CAN BE FAIRLY
DETERMINED.
UBMC has a history of contracting with physicians for jobs
terminable for cause.10 Dr. Hardy has alleged this in previous pleadings,
and the Utah Supreme Court recognized that UBMC's contract history is
relevant in determining the scope of the "just cause" provision. In fact, the
Utah Supreme Court went so far as to remand this matter to the Trial Court
"to allow further development of the record." Uintah Basin, 2002 UT 92 at
^[18. The Trial Court ignored this directive and did not allow the additional
discovery requested by Dr. Hardy.
Instead, the Trial Court summarily discarded the other contracts which
prove that Dr. Hardy's was not the first to contain a "just cause" provision,
questioned Dr. Hardy's understanding of the provision, and completely
ignored the Supreme Court's determination that "[u]nder the bylaws, 'just
cause' appears to have a broad scope:..." Id. at f 18, note 4.

10

Drs. Sannella and Stewart both had contracts with UBMC that were
terminable for cause.
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A.

Summary Judgment is Not Appropriate When Discovery is
Not Complete,

The Utah Supreme Court acknowledged in Drysdale v. Ford Motor
Co., 947 P.2d 678 (Utah 1997) that '"[l]itigants must be able to present their
cases fully to the court before judgment can be rendered against them unless
it is obvious from the evidence before the court that the party opposing
judgment can establish no right to recovery." 5 Id. at 680 (citing Mountain
States Tel, 681 P.2d at 1261). The Court went on to state that "[pjrior to
the completion of discovery, however, it is often difficult to ascertain
whether the nonmoving party will be able to sustain its claims. In such a
case, summary judgment should generally be denied." Id. Even without
additional discovery, Dr. Hardy has offered sufficient evidence to survive
summary judgment, creating a genuine issue of material fact on which
reasonable minds could differ.
However, additional discovery is necessary in this case to determine
whether UBMC contracted with any other physicians who were terminable
for cause. Dr. Hardy is vitally interested in finding out why UBMC entered
into contracts similar to his, without durations, with Drs. Sannella and
Stewart. To this end, Dr. Hardy has a right to depose Dr. Stewart regarding
his contract. UBMC argued on summary judgment that further discovery
was not needed despite specifically refusing to allow Dr. Stewart to testify
24

as to the terms of his contract with UBMC—a contract that permits
termination only under two very restrictive circumstances. See Exhibit G to
Dr. Hardy's Opposition to Plaintiffs Post Remand Motion for Summary
Judgment where Dr. Hardy's counsel asks about the terms of Dr. Stewart's
contract with UBMC and UBMC's counsel instructs him not to answer. (R.
1500). Regarding Dr. Stewart's contract, why did UBMC continue to honor
a contract devoid of a durational limit, like Dr. Stewart's, when the hospital
was arguing in this litigation that such a contract was unreasonable? These
are all questions that need to be answered before reasonableness can be
determined.
Further, UBMC refused in the past to provide other UBMC contracts
which were requested by Dr. Hardy. Although it provided some of these
contracts with its summary judgment pleadings, Dr. Hardy is not confident
that UBMC has provided all contracts. In addition, UBMC states that it has
"negotiated a few contracts, primarily in the 1980's, that had indefinite
durations to entice doctors to work at UBMC." (R. 1415). UBMC has not
produced those contracts to Dr. Hardy and they are relevant in determining
the types of contracts UBMC "typically enters into with medical
professionals." Uintah Basin, 2002 UT 92 at ^fl8. This admission confirms
that UBMC did, in fact, typically enter into contracts with indefinite
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durations when circumstances called for it. It makes no difference when
UBMC entered those contracts, only that it did. Surely a jury could find
this evidence compelling in determining the reasonableness of Dr. Hardy's
contract.
Dr. Hardy should be allowed to find out why some of U B M C s
contracts contain durational limits, while others, like his, are terminable
only for cause. What is the distinction? Dr. Hardy believes that the answer
to this question is simple. The contracts that have durational limits cover
patient-based doctors, or doctors who develop a practice independent of a
hospital. Dr. Hardy is a hospital-based physician who relies on other
doctors for his practice. Dr. Hardy (like Dr. Stewart who is a radiologist)
does not have private patients. Rather, Dr. Hardy's pathology practice is a
medical service made available to other doctors who may have patients at
the hospital. The Trial Court disregarded this argument altogether.
Additionally, how do the durational contracts work? Do they automatically
renew every few years? If so, how is this different from Dr. Hardy's
contract? Realistically, the durational contracts, if they automatically
renew, are terminable for cause, meaning they are based on that physician's
professional competence.
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In addition, Dr. Hardy may wish to hire an additional expert, or
qualify an existing expert on the issue of standard contract provisions
utilized by rural hospitals when trying to attract hospital-based doctors such
as pathologists or radiologists. What is the "industry practice" of rural
hospitals in contracting with hospital-based physicians? UBMC admits that
it uses the indefinite contract terminable only for cause when it has trouble
attracting doctors, and the approach taken by other hospitals surely will
assist the jury with the determination of the reasonableness of the "just
cause" provision in Dr. Hardy's contract. (R. 1415). In essence, the Utah
Supreme Court asked the Trial Court to survey the entire landscape upon
which Dr. Hardy's Agreement would be assessed and decide whether a
reasonable person could somehow interpret the facts as advanced by Dr.
Hardy were reasonable in any plausible way. Without additional discovery,
a fair determination about the reasonableness of Dr. Hardy's Agreement
cannot possibly be made.
B.

The Scope of the "Just Cause" Provision Relates to UBMC's
Understanding of its Own Rights and Powers to Terminate a
Physician, Not Dr. Hardy's Understanding of the Term.

Both the Trial Court and UBMC make much of Dr. Hardy's
declaration which details his understanding of the meaning of "just cause."
UBMC was successful in convincing the Trial Court that Dr. Hardy's

27

understanding of "just cause" is relevant to determining the scope of the
"just cause" provision. However, Dr. Hardy's understanding of the meaning
of the term "just cause" is secondary. The Utah Supreme Court stated that
the scope of the "just cause" provision "depends in large part on the amount
of discretion [the] provision gives to successor boards." Uintah Basin, 2002
UT 92 at 1}18. The Utah Supreme Court noted that under UBMC's bylaws,
"'just cause' appears to have a broad scope: for instance, the board may
terminate a member of the medical staff for any reason 'reasonably related
to the delivery of quality patient care.'" Id. at ^[18, note 4. The Trial Court
misapplied Uintah Basin and stated that "[g]iven Dr. Hardy's understanding
of the intended scope of the just cause clause in light of the Utah Supreme
Court's opinion, the contract offered little discretion to successor boards."
(R. 1625). The Utah Supreme Court did not determine that the "just cause"
provision in Dr. Hardy's contract is narrow. In fact, the Court held just the
opposite as noted above. Uintah Basin, 2002 UT 92 at f 18, note 4. It is
clear that it makes no difference what Dr. Hardy understands "just cause" to
mean. The scope of the clause applies to UBMC's power and/or
understanding of its power. What is important, is the UBMC Board of
Trustees' intent in contracting with Dr. Hardy as to those circumstances
under which UBMC might terminate Dr. Hardy's Agreement. The focus
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should be on UBMC, not on what Dr. Hardy thought were the instances
where he could be terminated.
Even if the scope revolved around Dr. Hardy's understanding, this
Court should find that the Trial Court erred in making credibility
determinations at the summary judgment stage. Dr. Hardy's declaration was
submitted simply to expand on his understanding of the meaning of "just
cause," and it in no way contradicts his deposition testimony.11 The Trial
Court continued down its errant path by passing judgment on the declaration
submitted by Dr. Hardy. Rather than seeing the declaration for what it was
(i.e., an exposition of the circumstances where Dr. Hardy's contract might
be terminated for reasons other than those arising from Dr. Hardy's
performance), the Trial Court dismissed it as self-serving. In light of the
Utah Supreme Court's directive to outline the instances where the contract
might be terminated, Dr. Hardy addressed those instances where his
profession (pathology) or the circumstances of the hospital (e.g., closure of
the hospital for myriad reasons) might radically change, thereby permitting
a termination of the contract. In no way did Dr. Hardy contradict what he
said at his deposition; rather he addressed a question that was not asked of
him at his deposition: are there circumstances, other than Dr. Hardy's
11

See relevant portions of Dr. Hardy's deposition at R. 1389-93, a true and
correct copy of which is included in the Addendum as Exhibit "H".
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with the arrangement it had with Dr. Hardy.
The Utah Supreme Court has clearly stated its position on the issue of
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raise an issue of fact by his own affidavit which contradicts his
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deposition..." Id. at 1172-73 (emphasis added). Dr. Hardy was asked
during his deposition what he thought u just cause" meant. He gave an
honest answer. Dr. Hardy's declaration is simply an expansion of his
deposition answer, not a contradiction as required in Webster.
The Trial Court also erred when it determined that Dr. Hardy's
declaration could not be relied upon. It is not proper at the summary
judgment stage for the Trial Court to assess the credibility or reliability of
Dr. Hardy's declaration as compared to his deposition testimony. See
Trujillo, 986 P.2d at f42 (the question of credibility should not be
determined on summary judgment).
III.

WHETHER OR NOT DR. HARDY'S CONTRACT DURATION IS
REASONABLE IS A QUESTION OF FACT FOR THE JURY.
In Uintah Basin, the Utah Supreme Court stated that "[w]hether a

contract's duration is 'reasonable' depends on the circumstances of each
case." Uintah Basin, 2002 UT 92 at 1{17.13 The Trial Court must determine
whether there is enough evidence for a jury to find in Dr. Hardy's favor
regarding reasonableness of duration, but once the Court makes that
determination, fact issues, like whether the duration of the contract is
12

See also Mountain States, 681 P.2d at 1261.

13

Whether the use of the term "district court" in the opinion was a result of
carelessness, ease of reference, or the status of the case on appeal, it
certainly does not mean that the Judge is to decide every issue.
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Extrinsic Evidence is Admissible in. this Case to Determine
Reasonableness,

There is relevant extrinsic c\ ideuce in this case that should be
provided to tl le trier of feet Black's I aw Dictionary defines "extrinsic
a contract bi it not appearing on tl le f ace
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578 (7th ed. 1999). The Supreme Court noted

the importance of U B M C ' s past ccmtractual practices with its physicians.
'I 1 lis evidence is extrinsic as it does not appear on the face of the contract.
1

* See Records v. Briggs, 887 P.2d 864 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) where
Court stated that "[generally, when contract interpretation will be
determined by extrinsic evidence of intent, it becomes a question of fact."
Id. at 871. The Court went on to hold that "if [the]'extrinsic evidence is
disputed, then a material fact is also disputed, and summary judgment
cannot be granted." T '
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This and other evidence relevant to the reasonableness determination is
necessary for a fair interpretation of Dr. Hardy's contract. Extrinsic
evidence is used to prove intent as set forth in Ward v. Intermountain
Farmers Assoc, 907 P.2d 264 (Utah 1995) where the Court stated that
"'[Rational interpretation requires at least a preliminary consideration of all
credible evidence offered to prove the intention of the parties...'" Id. at 268
(citation omitted). Further, extrinsic evidence is admissible "if the meaning
of the contract is ambiguous or uncertain." Id. The Utah Supreme Court
has directed that the reasonableness of the duration of Dr. Hardy's contract
be determined. Inasmuch as it is proper to use extrinsic evidence to do so,
the jury must make this determination.
B.

Reasonableness of Duration is a Question of Fact for the
Jury to Determine.

Even if extrinsic evidence is not admissible, it is a well-settled
contract law principle that the jury evaluates reasonableness of duration. In
Stutzke v. D.G.C. Liquidation Co., 533 So.2d 897 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988),
the Florida Court of Appeals held that "determination of what is a
reasonable time is for the jury to make." Id. at 899; see also Burger Chef
Syst., Inc. v. Burger Chef of Fla., Inc., 317 So.2d 795, 798 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1975)(holding that a jury evaluates what is a reasonable time for
contract duration). In Greene v. Oliver Realty, Inc., 526 A.2d 1192 (Pa.
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AMFAC, Inc. *. ;; ui.%i*i Beachcomber Inv. c^., coV I\2u 10, 24 (Haw.
1992). The evidence in this case is not clear or decisive, At a minimum,
reasonable minds could diik r n^ tn whether the contract duration set forth in

First, the Utah Supreme Court recognized that an indeflnit
not necessarily result in aii unreasonable contract. Uintah Basin, 2002 UI
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92 at f 17. Second, UBMC drafted the contract provision at issue. During
negotiations to attract Dr. Hardy to the hospital, UBMC used its existing
contract with its previous pathologist, Dr. Sannella, as the template for its
contract offer to Dr. Hardy. While this contract may or may not have been
unusual when compared to other fields of specialty, UBMC clearly had a
precedent for this type of arrangement with its pathologist.
In addition, UBMC admits that a similar indefinite contract terminable
for cause was entered into with Dr. Stewart who is a radiologist. This is
important to the reasonableness determination because both pathologists and
radiologists are hospital-based practitioners. In other words, they are
unique because they rely on other doctors for their practice—they do not
bring in their own patients. So, while patient-based doctors may have been
negotiating contracts with terms for one year to five years, the doctors who
have hospital-based practices are different.
UBMC also admits that in addition to utilizing "just cause" contracts
to attract hospital-based doctors, it has utilized "just cause" contracts for
other physicians when it was difficult to attract physicians to its hospital
with limited terms. (R. 1415). That is the function of the open market
facing UBMC when it contracts under its proprietary function. Negotiations
and market forces require different results in different conditions, and at
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different times. UBMC should not be allowed to change the terms of that
negotiation now that sonic time has passed and it thinks it can get a better
deal.15
Throughout the histor> < <•
'language (llliihi! illli

. igation, I IBI\ 1C has emphasized the

niilun I, i . dial'lnl .ind s)|»iiu, ill In llu |i.n Mrs, 'nun U MM

nocd^'of Uintah Basin M^'dii'itl frntiM ,it tlii>; iiii n * 11«' I nil I i I In linn ill
contracting is the only time period that matters, and a jury should decide,
based on the facts, whether the duration of Dr. Hard) \ contract was
reasonable when made,16 Inasmuch as there is currently i 10 Utah case la;v\
addressing this aspect oi a jury's duly, and, because contract interpretation

whether re is, • , r]- -,
judge, ^x. xx^U; oelieves that the law u vi^cii, tmo i^ a question of fact
reserved for the jury.
15

See Salt Lake City v. State, 448 P.2d 350, 354 (Utah 1968)(noting that "a
city has no more right to repudiate its contracts than has a private person,"
and rebuking the city because, having gained the benefit of the bargain
made, it "hopes to find a loophole by which it can escape from its duty"
under the same contract); Bair v. Layton City Corp., 307 P.2d 895, 902-03
(Utah 1957)(noting that the measurement for reasonableness is not after
time has passed, but determined at the time the contract was entered into,
and if the necessities of the situation at that time called for such a contract,
then it is reasonable).
See generally Consolidated Wagon & Mach. Lu. v. Wright, 190 P. 937,
939 (Utah 1920).
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IV.

THERE IS A GENUINE DISPUTE AS TO WHETHER UBMC
HAD JUST CAUSE TO TERMINATE THE AGREEMENT AND
THIS QUESTION MUST BE RESERVED FOR THE JURY.
The Utah Supreme Court held that u Dr. Hardy's indefinite-length

contract is terminable for 'just cause'" Uintah Basin, 2002 UT 92 at ^22.
The Trial Court has already ruled that the jury should decide whether
UBMC had "just cause" to terminate Dr. Hardy. (R. 737 & 1055). At an
absolute minimum, the evidence uncovered thus far demonstrates that there
is a genuine factual dispute over whether UBMC had legitimate business
reasons for terminating Dr. Hardy and hiring Dr. Allred, or whether
UBMC's alleged business reasons are an after-the-fact attempt to fabricate
"just cause." Some of the evidence creating a genuine issue of fact
includes:
• Testimony from Dr. Wayne Stewart, a member of the UBMC
Board of Trustees, that he never discussed with anyone at
UBMC the hospital's need for an on-site pathologist until Dr.
Allred began inquiring about the pathology position at UBMC.
(R. 603-05).
• Testimony from Dr. Elizabeth Hammond, Dr. Hardy's expert on
pathology and hospital hiring procedures for pathologists, that
UBMC did not adequately investigate Dr. Allred's credentials
before hiring him. (R. 599-602).
• Minutes from the UBMC Board of Trustees which do not reflect
any discussion of a need at UBMC for an on-site pathologist.
(R. 583-92).
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• ruiy Hussey's testimony thai umviL, conducted no invesuj. ;i.
of the financial impact of hiring Dr. Allred, (R. 596-98)
Brad LeBaron s testimony that UBMC never contacted a single
pathologist who _\ _r worked with Dr. Allred. (R. 594-95).
• There is no t - Menu: 11 • at I JBMC conducted any economic
analysis or legitimate inquiry as to the financial or economic
advantages of hiring Dr. Allred. Nor did UBMC list air
business reasons when it decided to terminate Dr. Hardy. (R.
1471, 1474 * M90).
lirad LeBaron's testimony that UBMC had substantial and
reoccurring problems with Dr. Allred's turn around time, and
that there were patient complaints from the emergency room
about Dr. Allred. (R. 1531).
* Dr. Allred is no longer working at LiiMC and has left the State
of Utah.
There are ;H^

HUT , < mpelling facts which suggest that UBMC did not

have "just cause" to terminate Dr. Hardy, including, most importantly, the
fact tl lat tl lere * ei e never any complaints made against Di I lai d> during 1 lis
ei i lplo} i nei it.
Dr. Hardy has a right to have a ji ir> weigh the facts set f oi th at: o • / e,
and others, to determine whether UBMC had "just cause" to terminate his
employment. Reasonable minds could differ as to this determination and,
therefore, summary judgment is inappropriate.
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CONCLUSION
The Trial Court abdicated its duty in the summary judgment
proceedings by not construing the evidence presented to it in the light most
favorable to Dr. Hardy as the non-moving party. Dr. Hardy has presented
more than enough evidence, even without developing the record as directed
by the Utah Supreme Court, on which reasonable minds can differ and find
in his favor. Further, the Court infringed on the jury's role in this matter
which is to determine whether the duration of Dr. Hardy's contract is
reasonable and whether UBMC had "just cause" to terminate Dr. Hardy.
The Utah Supreme Court remanded this case to the Trial Court so that the
Trial Court could determine the scope of the "just cause" provision and that
is all. The Utah Supreme Court even went so far as to suggest how the Trial
Court could go about making this decision, and clearly set forth its own
interpretation of UBMC s bylaws which suggest that the scope of the "just
cause" provision is broad.
Although contract interpretation is a mixed question of law and fact,
there is compelling case law in other states holding that reasonableness of
duration is a question of fact for the jury to decide. This makes sense
because a jury should weigh the factors that went into the decision to make
Dr. Hardy's contract terminable only for "just cause." The Trial Court, in
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overstepping its duU

ompletely disregarded the evidence presented to ii

regarding why UBMC and Dr. Hardy contracted as they did. Inasmuch as
Utah law has not squarely addressed this issue, this Court should determine
whethei the jury is, in lael, entitled to determine reasonableness of duration.
l ; iiu!l\
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previously and nothing has changed in this case to reverse that decision.
The facts in this case show that there is a genuine issue of material fact c*i.
which reasonable minds could differ. Accordingly, this Court should enter
an order reversing the I i ial Court' s ruling granting summary judgment in
liivr
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Tab A

Duct.e'stte county Hospital

November ?9,
Leo W. Hardy, M.D.
P.O. Box 795
Price, UT 84501
Dear Dr. Hardy:
We appreciate your response to our request to have a formal agreement in handling oui
Pathology needs. Listed below is the proposal submitted by you. I have reviewed this with
Joe Hokett and have found that it meets the needs of Uintah Basin Medical Center at this
time. Our agreement, therefore, includes the following
1.
2.

J

J.

Dr, Hardy agrees to personally visit the Uintah Basm Medical Center Laboratory
weekly or will have another pathologist visit the hospital if he is unavailable.
Visits will not be substituted with technologists. Duration of visit will be for one to
two hours devoted lo the following activities
a.
CAP proficiency survey reviews.
b.
Review of Uintah Basin Medical Center QC program.
c.
Recommending process to investigate technical and administrative |nul I in
and advise adoption of policies and/or procedures foe correction.
d.
Develop liaison with all full-time Medical Staff members to enabk lull
understanding of laboratory's role in supporting Medical Staffs mission. Will
attend Medical Staff meetings quarterly. This meeting will be considered chat
week's laboratory visit
Will be available to rhe Medical Staff tor help with interpretation of laboratory
results. This would be a physician-to-physician consult.
Will be available for more complex consultations, bone marrow biopsies, or tine
needle aspiration biopsy of superficial masses (i.e., breast, thyroid, lymph node).
Procedures in these categories will be direct patient services and will be billed as
such.
Will undertake teaching activities ioi Iiuil Mniirjl Mill mH I <h< i ilm v Si ill HI,„-,
new procedures sue to be introduced

Leo W. Hardy, M.D.
November 29, 1994
Page 2 of 2
6.

7.

8.

9.
10.

11.

Every opportunity to educate Laboratory Staff in those areas where new
information or the need for better understanding of the need for clinical consultation
will be pursued.
Will take responsibility for continued CLIA accreditation, including interim selfinspection, review of manuals, and all activities CLIA has identified as Laboratory
Director responsibilities.
Uintah Basin Medical Center is permitted to formally register me with the State of
Utah and CAP as Laboratory Director, and inclusion of my name on any and all
laboratory reports, thus documenting my medicolegal relationship with the Uintah
Basin Medical Center Laboratory.
Uintah Basin Medical Center will pay a Laboratory Director's fee of $400.00 per
month,
All surgical pathology and extra-genital cytology is referred to the Laboratory
Director's practice, additional activities such as Medical Staff committee work will be
undertaken. These may include Infection Control, Tissue Reviews, Surgical Case
Review, Blood Utilization Review, and involvement in hospital-wide Continuing
Quality Improvement.
This agreement shall become effective August 1, 1994 and continue to bind the parties
to the terms hereof until terminated after ninety (90) days written notice for just cause
of termination by either party or by mutual consent of the parties to a shorter notice
period.

Your signature below indicates your acceptance of the responsibilities, services and benefits
listed below.
Sincerely,

Bradley D.XeBaron, CHE
Administrator

LeoW
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C
Supreme Court of Utah.
UINTAH BASIN MEDICAL CENTER, Plaintiff
and Appellee,

governing body's ability to respond to the public's
changing needs.
[3] Municipal Corporations €=^232
268k232 Most Cited Cases

v.

Leo W. HARDY, M.D., Defendant and Appellant.
No. 20000501.
Aug. 30, 2002.

Doctor brought action against county hospital after
hospital's board of trustees voided contract under
which doctor was to provide pathological services
to hospital. The District Court, Eighth District,
Duchesne County, John R. Anderson, J., granted
hospital's motion for summary judgment. Doctor
appealed. The Supreme Court, Durrant, Associate
C.J., held that: (1) contract involved a proprietary
function and therefore was enforceable against
successor boards of trustees if of a reasonable
duration; (2) issue of whether contract was of a
reasonable duration required remand; and (3) term
of length could not be read into contract.
Remanded with instructions.
Russon, J., concurred in part and dissented in part
with opinion in which Howe, J., concurred.
West Headnotes
[1] Appeal and Error €==>863
30k863 Most Cited Cases
In deciding whether the trial court correctly granted
summary judgment as a matter of law, the Supreme
Court gives no deference to the trial court's view of
the law; it is reviewed for correctness.
[2] Municipal Corporations €=>232
268k232 Most Cited Cases
Government contracts that extend beyond the term
of the governing body that originally entered into
the contract represent a public policy concern, as
such contracts, if enforced, potentially allow a
former governing body to perpetuate its policies
beyond its term and thereby limit a successor

Under the governmental/proprietary
test to
determine whether a government contract should be
enforced against a successor governing body, a
contract is (1) unenforceable against successor
governing bodies if it involves a governmental
power or function, but (2) enforceable against
successor governing bodies if it involves a
proprietary power or function and is of a reasonable
duration.
[4] Municipal Corporations €==>232
268k232 Most Cited Cases
Supreme Court declined to repudiate the
governmental/proprietary test, used to determine
whether a government contract should be enforced
against a successor government body.
[5] Counties €=^114
104kl 14 Most Cited Cases
Contract for pathology services between doctor and
county hospital involved a proprietary function and
therefore was enforceable against successor boards
of trustees if it was of a reasonable duration;
services provided were not indispensable to the
proper functioning of government, and doctor
merely recommended policies related to hospital's
pathology laboratory, while the board of trustees
retained ultimate decision making authority.
[6] Appeal and Error €=^172(1)
30kl72(l) Most Cited Cases
Doctor failed to raise argument in trial court that the
county hospital's successor board of trustees was
precluded from terminating his personal services
contract with hospital because the board earlier
ratified it, and thus Supreme Court declined to hear
argument on appeal.
[7] Appeal and Error €==>1178(1)
30kl 178(1) Most Cited Cases
Issue of whether contract between doctor and
county hospital for doctor to provide pathological
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services was of a reasonable duration at
they entered into the contract, and thus
contract was an enforceable proprietary
under the governmental/proprietary test,
remand.

the time
whether
contract
required

[8] Municipal Corporations €=>232
268k232 Most Cited Cases
Whether a contract's duration is reasonable for
purposes of governmental/proprietary test to
determine whether a government contract is binding
on successor governing bodies depends on the
circumstances of each case.
[9] Municipal Corporations €=^>232
268k232 Most Cited Cases
Depending on the circumstances, a lengthy or
indefinite contractual duration is not necessarily an
unreasonable
duration
under
the
governmental/proprietary test for a public contract
to exist.
[10] Counties €=^126
104k 126 Most Cited Cases
Term of length could not be read into personal
services contract between doctor and county
hospital; contract did not specify a duration,
contract provided for termination for "just cause,"
parties agreed in their appellate briefs that the
contract was of indefinite length, and term was not
necessary to determine prospective damages for
breach of the contract.
[11] Contracts € ^ 9 ( 3 )
95k9(3) Most Cited Cases
Parties have the right to enter into indefinite length
contracts terminable for cause.
[12] Master and Servant €=^7
255k7 Most Cited Cases
[12] Reformation of Instruments €=>16
328k 16 Most Cited Cases
When a contract for employment or personal
services does not recite a fixed term, the law does
not call for the judicial reformation of the contract
to impose a term, especially when neither party
Copr. © West 2004 No Claim

disputes the contract was of indefinite duration.
*1166 Blaine J. Bernard, Eric G. Maxfield,
Christine T. Greenwood, E. Blaine Rawson, Salt
Lake City, for plaintiff.
John P. Harrington, Joni J. Jones, Melissa H. Bailey
, Salt Lake City, for defendant.

INTRODUCTION
DURRANT, Associate Chief Justice:
f 1 This appeal concerns the voidability of certain
government contracts. Specifically, we consider
the question of when a contract entered into by a
predecessor governing body is voidable by a
successor governing body. Throughout the
country, substantial case law has developed to
distinguish between those government contracts that
may be voided and those that may not be voided by
a successor governing body. Various common law
tests have been articulated, all designed to balance
the tension between the right of a successor
governing body to implement its own policies and
not be bound by those of a former body, and the
interest in providing some certainty to parties who
contract with governing bodies. Utah courts have
relied on the governmental/proprietary test, a test
under which contracts involving proprietary
functions and having reasonable durations are
enforceable against successor governing bodies.
t 2 In this case, the district court granted summary
judgment to a county hospital on the theory that the
particular contract at issue, a contract for the
provision of pathological services to the hospital by
a doctor, was voidable by the hospital's governing
body—its board of trustees. The district court held
that the contract had been entered into by a
predecessor board and thus was voidable by
successor boards.
% 3 Because we conclude that the contract for
pathological services involves a proprietary
function, we remand with instructions that the
district court determine whether the contract's
duration was reasonable.
BACKGROUND
f

4 The following
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November 29, 1994, Dr. Leo Hardy entered into a
contract with Uintah Basin Medical *1167 Center
("UBMC"), a hospital owned by Duchesne County
and operated by a board of trustees. Under the
terms of the contract, Dr. Hardy received $400 per
month for providing UBMC pathological services
on a part-time basis and serving as the director of its
pathology laboratory. The contract did not recite a
termination date, but provided that either party
could terminate the contract for "just cause"
following ninety days' notice.
f 5 Although Dr. Hardy performed his contractual
obligations
satisfactorily
and
received
no
complaints from UBMC or its medical staff, on July
18, 1996, the UBMC board of trustees voted to give
Dr. Hardy ninety days' notice and invite another
doctor to join its medical staff as a pathologist and
emergency room physician. When Dr. Hardy's
termination became effective, UBMC sought a
declaratory judgment that it had "just cause" to
terminate the contract. Dr. Hardy counterclaimed,
contending that UBMC materially breached the
contract by terminating him because UBMC did not
have "just cause." The district court initially
denied the parties' respective motions for summary
judgment, ruling that the jury would decide whether
UBMC had "just cause".
If 6 Following this ruling, the district court
accepted supplemental briefing from the parties on
an issue UBMC had raised for the first time in its
answer to Dr. Hardy's counterclaim: whether the
contract violated common law rules against
government contracts that bind successor governing
bodies. After hearing from the parties, the court
granted UBMC summary judgment on the ground
that the contract was voidable even without " 'just
cause' simply because it could not bind successor
Boards." In reaching this conclusion, the district
court explained, "Due to the rapid advance of
science, medicine [sic] changes and needs of
patients there should be no reason for such an
agreement to continue into the future or be binding
on successor [b]oards where the governing [b]oard
is a governmental entity." Dr. Hardy appeals.
Section 78-2-2(3)(j) of the Utah Code gives us
appellate jurisdiction over this case. Utah Code
Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(j) (Supp.2001).
ANALYSIS
I. STANDARD OF REVIEW

[1] | 7 "In deciding whether the trial court
correctly granted [summary] judgment as a matter
of law, 'we give no deference to the trial court's
view of the law; we review it for correctness.' "
SME Indus., Inc. v. Thompson, Ventulett, Stainback
& Assocs., 2001 UT 54, \ 9, 28 P.3d 669 (quoting
Ron Case Roofing & Asphalt Paving, Inc. v.
Blomquist, 113 P.2d 1382, 1385 (Utah 1989)).
II. RATIONALE BEHIND COMMON LAW
RESTRICTIONS ON GOVERNMENT
CONTRACTS THAT BIND
SUCCESSOR GOVERNING BODIES
f 8 Before addressing Dr. Hardy's specific claims
on appeal, we briefly discuss the rationale behind
the common law rules regarding contracts that bind
successor governing bodies.
[2] f 9 Government contracts raise public policy
concerns beyond those involved with private
contracts. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Chester Hous.
Auth, 389 Pa. 314, 132 A.2d 873, 876 (1957).
One such concern involves contracts that extend
beyond the term of the governing body that
originally entered into the contract. Such contracts,
if enforced, potentially allow a former governing
body to perpetuate its policies beyond its term and
thereby limit a successor governing body's ability to
respond to the public's changing needs. See
generally Figuly v. City of Douglas, 853 F.Supp.
381,384(D.Wyo.l994).
f 10 While such concerns militate against
enforcing a predecessor governing body's contracts
against its successors, the common law also
recognizes
a
countervailing
concern:
that
permitting
successor
governing
bodies
to
indiscriminately terminate government contracts
may make private parties hesitant to contract with
government entities, thereby reducing the viability
of contracts as a means of solving public problems.
See Plant Food Co. v. City of Charlotte, 214 N.C.
518, 199 S.E. 712,714(1938).
[3][4] 1 11 A desire to accommodate these
competing concerns animates the various common
law tests for determining whether a *1168 contract
should be enforced against a successor governing
body. The test on which Utah courts rely is known
as the governmental/proprietary test. See Bair v.
Layton City Corp, 6 Utah 2d 138, 147-48, 307
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P.2d 895, 902 (1957); see also Salt Lake City v.
State, 22 Utah 2d 37, 42, 448 P.2d 350, 354 (1968)
(holding that contract for providing water to state
capitol grounds was enforceable under the
governmental/proprietary test). [FN1] Under the
governmental/proprietary test, a contract is (1)
unenforceable against successor governing bodies if
it involves a governmental power or function, but
(2) enforceable against successor governing bodies
if it involves a proprietary power or function and is
of a reasonable duration. Bair, 6 Utah 2d at
147-48, 307 P.2d at 902.

FN1. Citing various criticisms of the
governmental/proprietary test, both parties
urge us to repudiate it in favor of other
common law tests. However, because the
parties have failed to show that any of their
suggested tests is clearly better than the
governmental/proprietary test, we decline
to repudiate it at this time. See State v.
Menzies, 889 P.2d 393, 398 (Utah 1994)
(noting that because of stare decisis,
"[t]hose asking us to overturn prior
precedent have a substantial burden of
persuasion").

f
12
Having
set
forth
the
governmental/proprietary test, we next apply it to
Dr. Hardy's contract to determine whether the
contract may be validly enforced against successor
hospital boards of trustees.
III. WHETHER DR. HARDY'S CONTRACT IS
ENFORCEABLE AGAINST SUCCESSOR
BOARDS OF
TRUSTEES
[5][6] % 1 3 Dr. Hardy maintains the district court
erred in concluding that his contract was voidable
because it bound successor boards. [FN2] Relying
on the governmental/proprietary test, Dr. Hardy
argues that his contract for pathological services
involves a proprietary function and therefore was
enforceable against successor boards provided it is
of a reasonable duration. We agree.

FN2. Dr. Hardy also argues that the
rationale behind the common law rules

does not apply (1) to appointed, staggered
boards like the UBMC board of trustees,
or (2) until a majority of the nine voting
members of the board are replaced. These
arguments are without merit. First, the
rationale behind the common law rules
applies to appointed, staggered governing
bodies because preexisting contracts may
also unduly inhibit these bodies in the
performance of their public duties. See
Mitchell, 132 A.2d at 877-78; Piedmont
Pub. Serv. Dist. v. Cowart, 319 S.C. 124,
459 S.E.2d
876, 882 (App.1995).
Second, there is inadequate support'in the
law for the contention that a majority
turnover in the UBMC board is required
before the board can challenge the
contract. See Mariano & Assocs., P.C v.
Bd of County Comm'rs, 131 P.2d 323, 331
(Wyo.1987) (concluding that precedent did
not support argument that turnover in
board was required before it could
challenge validity of contract).
In addition, Dr. Hardy argues that the
successor UBMC board was precluded
from terminating his contract because the
board earlier ratified it. Since this issue
was not raised below, we decline to
address it. See Monson v. Carver, 928
P.2d 1017, 1022 (Utah 1996).

A. Dr. Hardy's Contract Was Proprietary in
Nature
f 14 The factors on which courts have relied to
distinguish between governmental and proprietary
contracts strongly support the conclusion that Dr.
Hardy's contract for pathological services involves a
proprietary function. First, UBMC has not
demonstrated that the services Dr. Hardy provides
under the contract are "indispensable to the proper
functioning of government." County Council v. SHL
Systemhouse Corp., 60 F.Supp.2d 456, 465
(E.D.Pa.1999). To the contrary, consistent with the
view that Dr. Hardy's contract did not involve
functions essential to governance, Duchesne County
conveyed the hospital to a non-profit organization
on July 3, 2000.
^ 15 Moreover, under the terms of the contract,
Dr. Hardy merely recommended, but did not have
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authority to set, policies related to UBMC's
pathology laboratory. The board's retention of this
policymaking discretion weighs heavily in favor of
deeming the contract proprietary. See Rhode
Island Student Loan Auth. v. NELS, Inc., 550 A.2d
624, 627 (R.I. 1988) (concluding contract was
proprietary because contracting party "could neither
exercise discretion nor set policy in performance of
its duties").
K 16 Accordingly, we conclude that Dr. Hardy's
contract involves a proprietary function.
*1169 B. Whether Dr. Hardy's Contract Was of
Reasonable Duration Depends on
the Scope of the Contract's "Just Cause" Provision
[7][8][9] f 17 Under the governmental/proprietary
test, Dr. Hardy's proprietary contract is enforceable
if its duration was reasonable at the time the parties
executed the contract. Bair, 6 Utah 2d at 148, 307
P.2d at 902. Whether a contract's duration is
"reasonable" depends on the circumstances of each
case. See, e.g., id, 6 Utah 2d at 143, 148, 307
P.2d at 899, 903 (holding that a fifty-year sewage
treatment contract was valid because its lengthy
duration allowed city to obtain treatment facilities
without undue delay and expense, and also
facilitated long-term planning). Depending on the
circumstances, a lengthy or indefinite contractual
duration is not necessarily unreasonable. See id;
see also Salt Lake City, 22 Utah 2d at 42, 448 P.2d
at 354 (validating contract that required city to
provide free water to land as long as the land served
as the state capitol grounds, noting that city derives
continuing economic benefit from capitol's
presence).
U 18 As the record has been inadequately
developed on the issue of the reasonableness of the
contract's duration, we remand to permit the district
court to allow further development of the record
and to then make this determination. On remand,
as a preliminary matter, the district court should
interpret the intended scope of the contract's "just
cause" provision, [FN3] since the reasonableness of
the contract's duration depends in large part on the
amount of discretion this provision gives to
successor boards. For example, if the "just cause"
provision gives successor boards broad discretion to
terminate Dr. Hardy (e.g., to improve patient care,
for fiscal considerations), the contract is more likely
Copr. © West 2004 No Claim

to be of a reasonable duration than if the "just
cause" provision permitted termination only for
deficient job performance. In evaluating whether
the duration is reasonable, the district court may
also find it useful to compare Dr. Hardy's contract
to the agreements UBMC typically enters into with
medical professionals. For example, UBMC's
bylaws concerning its medical staff suggest that
UBMC routinely enters into agreements under
which the only practical durational limit is a
liberally- construed "just cause" provision. [FN4]
The extent to which the durational limitations in Dr.
Hardy's contract conform to UBMC's usual
practices in similar situations may factor into the
district court's reasonableness assessment.

FN3. See Miller v. USAA Cas. Ins. Co.,
2002 UT 6, f 64, 44 P.3d 663 (noting that
determination of scope of contractual
"clause is a question of law for
determination by the district court because
it is a matter of contract interpretation").

FN4. Under UBMC's bylaws, although
appointments to the medical staff are
ostensibly limited to two years, staff
members are reappointed unless there is
"just cause." Under the bylaws, "just
cause" appears to have a broad scope: for
instance, the board may terminate a
member of the medical staff for any reason
"reasonably related to the delivery of
quality patient care."

T| 19 If* the district court determines that the
contract's duration is reasonable, the contract is
enforceable. The court should then determine
whether the UBMC board had "just cause" to
terminate Dr. Hardy. On the other hand, if the
district court determines that the contract's duration
is unreasonable, the court should not enforce the
contract.
[10][11] f 20 The dissent maintains that a term
should be implied into Dr. Hardy's contract. In
support of its argument, the dissent relies on canons
of construction that have been developed to aid
courts in discerning the parties' intent when a
contract fails to specify a duration. We reject the
Orig. U.S. Govt. Works
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dissent's position for several reasons. First, and
most importantly, neither party has argued in their
briefs in favor of implying a term. To the contrary,
both parties maintain that the contract should be
evaluated as an indefinite-length contract whose
duration is limited only by the "just cause"
provision. [FN5] In effect, *1170 then, the parties
have implicitly stipulated that the contract has an
indefinite term. [FN6] Implying a term would
therefore result in a contract that is contrary to the
intent of either party and violate the preeminent
goal of contractual interpretation (i.e., to give effect
to the intent of the parties). Buehner Block Co. v.
UWC Assocs., 752 P.2d 892, 895 (Utah 1988).
Accordingly, because the parties agree that the
contract should be treated as an indefinite-length
contract, there is no need to rely on canons of
construction for resolving ambiguities over whether
the parties intended the contract be of indefinite
duration. [FN7]

FN5. Dr. Hardy asserts the following in his
appellate brief:
To entice excellent physicians to move to
and remain in rural areas, hospitals often
add perks to the contracts, including "just
cause" termination provisions, or even
"lifetime"
contracts....
Given
the
necessities of the situation, such contracts
are of reasonable duration. Thus, [Dr.
Hardy's contract] passes the second part of
the Bair test....
Appellant's Br. at 21.
Despite disagreeing with Dr. Hardy on the
ultimate conclusion of whether an
indefinite-length contract with a "just
cause" provision is of reasonable duration,
UBMC clearly agrees that the contract was
of indefinite duration:
The potentially perpetual duration of Dr.
Hardy's contract with UBMC was limited
only by the "just cause" provision.... [Dr.
Hardy's] contract bound Duchesne County
indefinitely....
Appellee's Br. at 28-29.

FN6. The dissent acknowledges that
parties may enter into an indefinite-length
contract.

FN7. The dissent acknowledges that "both
parties contend that the contract should be
evaluated as an indefinite-length contract
limited only by just cause," yet nonetheless
argues for the imposition of a fixed
duration. The dissent has cited no cases,
nor are we aware of any, in which we
rejected parties' mutual concessions that
are in harmony and clearly expressed.
Given that the goal in interpreting
contracts is to give effect to the intent of
the parties, we should be particularly
reluctant to reject the parties' stipulations
or concessions in this case.
The clear import of the parties' concessions
is that the parties intended the contract to
be of indefinite duration. The imposition
of a fixed duration
is
therefore
incompatible with the parties' concessions.
Moreover, the law in Utah and numerous
other jurisdictions recognizes the right of
parties to enter into indefinite length
contracts terminable for cause. Johnson v.
Morton Thiokol, Inc., 818 P.2d 997,
1000-01 & n. 9 (Utah 1991); e.g., Shah v.
Am. Synthetic Rubber Corp., 655 S.W.2d
489, 491-92 (Ky.1983). In short, the
imposition of a term would contradict the
parties' stated intent, disregard their legal
arguments, and impede their freedom to
contract. This we decline to do.
Significantly,
the
dissent
also
acknowledges that the parties have not
argued in their appellate briefs that a term
should be implied into the contract. In the
absence of adequate briefing, it would be
ill-advised for the court to raise this issue
sua sponte, especially if the dissent is
correct in asserting that this issue presents
a question of first impression. Prince v.
Bear River Mut. Ins. Co., 2002 UT 68, \
59, 56P.3d 524, 2002 WL 1610562 ("On
myriad occasions, we have held that we
will not address issues inadequately
briefed.").
[12] \ 21 Second, conspicuously absent from the
dissent's analysis is any citation to Utah precedent
that supports its position. Contrary to the dissent's
position, when a contract for employment or
personal services does not recite a fixed term, the
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law in Utah does not call for the judicial
reformation of the contract to impose a term,
especially where, as here, neither party disputes the
contract was of indefinite duration. Indeed, in a
case in which we traced the historical development
of the law associated with employment contracts,
we specifically noted that courts long ago
repudiated a common law rule under which a term
was implied when an employment contract did not
specify a duration. Berube v. Fashion Centre, Ltd.,
771 P.2d 1033, 1040-41 (Utah 1989). [FN8] In its
place, courts in Utah and elsewhere adopted the
at-will employment rule, under which employment
contracts that did not specify a duration were
generally presumed to be terminable at will. Id. at
1041. In time, Utah recognized an exception under
which an employee could rebut the at-will
presumption associated with
indefinite-length
contracts by showing the parties intended the
contract be terminable for cause. Johnson, 818 P.2d
at 1000-01 & n. 9; see also Brehany v. Nordstrom,
Inc., 812 P.2d 49, 54 (Utah 1991). Significantly,
nothing in Johnson, Brehany, or Berube suggests
that a court should sua sponte impose a term on an
indefinite-length employment contract that provides
for termination for cause.

FN8. Although Berube was a plurality
opinion, a majority of the court concurred
in the portion of the opinion that traced the
historical development of the common law
of employment contracts.
\ 22 Applying Utah precedent to Dr. Hardy's
contract confirms our view that a term should not be
read into the contract. First, because Dr. Hardy's
contract does not specify a duration, under Utah law
we initially presume it is of indefinite duration but
terminable at will. Berube, 111 P.2d at 1040- 41.
We do not apply the long-since rejected rule *1171
that previously required the implication of a term.
Id. Second, we consider whether any of the
exceptions to the at-will rule applies. In this
regard, we note that the parties expressly provided
the contract was terminable for "just cause." We
further note that the parties agree in their appellate
briefs that the contract is of indefinite length and
terminable only for "just cause." Accordingly, we
conclude that the at-will presumption has been
rebutted and Dr. Hardy's indefinite-length contract

is terminable for "just cause." Johnson, 818 P.2d at
1000-01 & n. 9; see also Brehany, 812 P.2d at 54.
[FN9]
FN9. The cases cited by the dissent are (1)
from other jurisdictions and therefore not
binding and (2) are either distinguishable
from, or inapposite to, the present case.
In reaching its conclusion, the dissent
relies heavily on cases not involving
employment contracts. This reliance is
tenuous given the fact that courts have
developed a unique set of rules for
employment
and
personal
service
contracts. See generally Berube, 111 P.2d
at 1040-41; Consol Theatres, Inc. v.
Theatrical Stage Employees Union, Local
16, 69 Cal.2d 713, 73 Cal.Rptr. 213, 447
P.2d 325, 335 & n. 12 (1968) (noting that
due to special policy considerations
associated with employment contracts,
such contracts are exempt from rule
applicable to other contracts under which
courts imply a term when a contract is
silent as to duration).
For
example,
the
dissent
cites
Mid-Southern Toyota, Ltd. v. Bug's
Imports, Inc., 453 S.W.2d 544, 549
(Ky.1970) in support of its position. That
case did not involve an employment
contract, however, and, moreover, when
faced with an employment contract, the
relevant jurisdiction (Kentucky) relies on
rules of interpretation specifically tailored
to employment contracts. Shah v. Am.
Synthetic Rubber Corp., 655 S.W.2d 489,
491-92 (Ky.1983) (confirming parties'
right to enter into contracts under which
person is employed for an indefinite period
of time and may be terminated only for
cause). Accordingly, the more pertinent
case from the cited jurisdiction is
consistent with the view that when an
employment contract is silent as to
duration, courts generally do not imply a
fixed term of years. See id. Instead, as in
Johnson, Kentucky courts presume such a
contract is terminable at will unless the
parties clearly express another criterion for
termination (e.g., for cause). Id.
The cases cited by the dissent that involve
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employment
contracts
provide
little
support for its conclusion that a term must
be imposed on Dr. Hardy's contract. For
example,
when
faced
with
an
indefinite-length employment contract, the
court in Paisley v. Lucas did not impose a
term but rather applied rules of
construction
specific
to employment
contracts. 346 Mo. 827, 143 S.W.2d 262,
271 (1940).

(6th Cir.1985) (quoting Koyen v. Consol. Edison
Co., 560 F.Supp. 1161, 1168-69 (S.D.N.Y.1983)).
"It is not difficult to determine the ... factors that are
pertinent on prospective damage awards." Koyen,
560 F.Supp. at 1168-69. Regardless, while the
determination of damages presents challenges, so
would the determination of a "reasonable" duration,
especially when both parties on appeal appear
resistant to the imposition of a term.
CONCLUSION

\ 23 Finally, we disagree with the dissent's
contention that the imposition of a term is justified
as a means of easing the calculation of prospective
damages. [FN 10] The dissent itself concedes that
parties can contract for an indefinite term. In
making this concession, the dissent implicitly
acknowledges that, to give effect to the parties'
intent, courts inevitably and routinely need to
determine damages associated with a breach of an
indefinite employment contract. In making such
determinations, courts have relied on various factors
in addressing the kinds of concerns raised by the
dissent:

FN 10. The dissent asks the following:
[If hospital breached the contract], how
would Dr. Hardy's damages be calculated?
Would Dr. Hardy be entitled to all of his
loss of earnings under the indefinite
contract? [W]ould he be entitled to
compensation ... to the date of his death?
To the date of his retirement? To the date
of his inability to perform his job
responsibilities ... ?
While a district court has considerable experience
in calculating future earnings, some basis must
appear in the record for such an award. Some of
the factors which district courts have employed to
alleviate the speculative nature of future damage
awards include an employee's duty to mitigate,
"the availability of employment opportunities, the
period within which one by reasonable efforts
may be re-employed, the employee's work and
life expectancy, the discount tables to determine
the present value of future damages and other
factors that are pertinent on prospective damage
awards."
Shore v. Fed. Express Corp., Ill F.2d 1155, 1160

f 24 We conclude that Dr. Hardy's contract for
pathological services is a proprietary *1172
contract, and thus is enforceable against successor
UBMC boards of trustees if it is of a reasonable
duration. Accordingly, we remand to the district
court to permit it to determine whether the
contract's duration is reasonable.
f 25 Remanded.

f 2 6 Chief Justice DURHAM and Judge BENCH
concur in Justice DURRANT's opinion.

RUSSON, Justice,
dissenting in part.

concurring

in

part

and

U 27 I concur with the majority opinion that the
contract in question is proprietary in nature and
could therefore bind the successor trustees of the
hospital. However, I differ with the analysis of the
opinion as to how the trial court is to determine the
reasonableness of the duration of the contract on
remand.
f 28 Well-settled canons of contract construction
and interpretation dictate that the trial court, when
faced with a contract of employment that is silent as
to its duration, and thus indefinite in length, but
expressly terminable only for just cause, should
determine by implication a reasonable term of
duration under the circumstances and then imply
that reasonable term into the contract as a matter of
law. Once the trial court determines a reasonable
term and implies it into the contract as a matter of
law, the trial court then should evaluate the implied
duration of the contract to determine if the duration
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of the contract was reasonable for purposes of
deciding whether the successor trustees of the
hospital are bound by the contract.
K 29 The employment contract between Uintah
Basin Medical Center and Dr. Hardy did not
include a specific term of duration and therefore
was of indefinite duration or perpetual in nature. It
did, however, expressly indicate that the contract
could be terminated only for just cause. Corbin on
Contracts provides guidance on how to treat such a
contract and indicates what legal effect such a
contract is to be given when it states:
When parties make a contract of employment
without specifying the length of service, but
indicate that it is not terminable at will, the legal
effect is that the parties are bound for a
"reasonable time." This is based upon
"implication" [i.e., the implication of a reasonable
term of duration].
Catherine M.A. McCauliff, 8 Corbin on Contracts
§ 34.11, at 262 (revised ed.1999) (emphasis added);
see also Consol. Theatres, Inc. v. Theatrical Stage
Employees Union Local 16, 69 Cal.2d 713, 73
Cal.Rptr. 213, 447 P.2d 325, 335 (1968) (en banc);
Ansbacher-Siegle Corp. v. Miller Chem. Co., 137
Neb. 142, 288 N.W. 538, 541 (1939); Tavel v.
Olsson, 91 Nev. 359, 535 P.2d 1287, 1288 (1975);
Smith v. Knutson, 16 N.D. 375, 36 N.W.2d 323,
328 (1949), overruled on other grounds by
Neibauer v. Well, 319 N.W.2d 143 (N.D. 1982);
Hall v. Hall, 158 Tex. 95, 308 S.W.2d 12, 15 (1957)
("Now it is doubtless true that, in contracts of the
general type of the instant one [an employment
contract for services], a term of reasonable duration
may be implied, with the result that they are not
void for lack of an essential provision and are not
terminable
at
will.");
Edwards
v.
Morrison-Knudsen Co., 61 Wash.2d 593, 379 P.2d
735, 738 (1963); 27 Am.Jur.2d Employment
Relationship § 38 (1996) (citing Shah v. Am.
Synthetic Rubber Corp., 655 S.W.2d 489 (Ky.1983)
). [FN1] *1173 This is precisely the situation
presented in the instant case.

FN1. The majority opinion criticizes this
dissent for its citation to applicable,
persuasive authority from the highest
courts of our kindred states and dismisses
that authority as nonbinding. Where this
court has not addressed a particular

question of law and where authoritative
precedent from our own jurisdiction is
absent, this court has not been reluctant to
seek out the experience, reasoning, and
counsel of the decisions of other high
courts as persuasive guidance in our
deliberations.
The majority opinion also criticizes the
dissent for its citation to certain cases
involving contracts other than for the
provision of employment or personal
services. However, all of the cases cited
in this paragraph involve contracts for
employment or personal services.
This
dissent
does
cite to
other
nonemployment contract cases later in f
32 for the additional proposition that
courts generally will imply a term of
duration into indefinite-length contracts.
The majority opinion maintains that those
nonemployment cases are inapposite and
that this dissent's reliance on them is
tenuous because the courts have developed
"a unique set of rules for employment and
personal services contracts." To the
extent that the cases mentioned by the
majority opinion as recognizing special
and different rules for employment
contracts actually refer to special rules or
policy considerations for employment
contracts, they do so only in reference to
the adoption of the general "at-will"
employment doctrine and its exceptions.
Those cases do not recognize special and
different rules with respect to the propriety
of implying a reasonable term into an
employment contract that is silent as to its
duration but outside of the "at-will"
employment doctrine because of the
explicit inclusion of an express "just
cause" provision, such as the contract at
issue here. In this regard, the majority
opinion misreads Berube v. Fashion
Centre, Ltd., Ill P.2d 1033 (Utah 1989),
Consolidated Theatres, Inc., Shah, and
Paisley v. Lucas, 346 Mo. 827, 143
S.W.2d 262 (1940). The cases cited
herein otherwise stand for the proposition
for which they are cited and support the
implication of duration for a reasonable
period.
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% 30 The determination of what constitutes a
"reasonable
time"
of
duration
of
the
indefinite-length employment contract that is not
terminable at will is either "(1) the time that seems
reasonable in the light of the circumstances existing
when the contract was made [or] (2) the time that
seems reasonable in light of the circumstances as
they occur during the course of performance."
McCauliff, 8 Corbin on Contracts § 34.11, at 262.
The reasonableness of an implied duration term is a
question of fact and is determined in reference to
the circumstances surrounding the transaction, the
situation of the parties, and the subject matter of the
contract. See William B. Tanner Co. v. Sparta
Tomah-Broad Co., 716 F.2d 1155, 1159-60 (7th
Cir.1983); Metal Assocs., Inc. v. E. Side Metal
Spinning & Stamping Corp., 165 F.2d 163, 165 (2d
Cir.1947); Consol Theatres, Inc., 73 Cal.Rptr.
213, 447 P.2d at 335; Brown Loan & Abstract Co.
v. Willis, 150 Ga. 122, 102 S.E. 814, 815 (1920);
Ansbacher-Siegle Corp., 288 N.W. at 541; Tavel,
535 P.2d at 1288; Borough of W. Caldwell v.
Borough of Caldwell, 26 N.J. 9, 138 A.2d 402, 412
(1958); Hall, 308 S.W.2d at 16-17; 17B C.J.S.
Contracts § 440 (1999); Margaret N. Kniffin, 5
Corbin on Contracts § 24.29 (revised ed.1998).
f 31 Corbin on Contracts ' suggested treatment of
contracts of this nature is based upon and supported
by well-settled principles and rules of contract
construction and interpretation. In the instant case,
the employment contract was silent as to its
duration and therefore indefinite or perpetual.
Contracts of perpetual duration are generally
disfavored by the law. See Paisley v. Lucas, 346
Mo. 827, 143 S.W.2d 262, 270 (1940) ("The courts
are prone to hold against the theory that a contract
confers a perpetuity of right or imposes a perpetuity
of obligation." (quotation omitted)); see also
Borough of W. Caldwell, 138 A.2d at 412; Farley
v. Salow, 61 Wis.2d 393, 227 N.W.2d 76, 82 (1975)
. Interpretations which avoid construing a contract
to have an indefinite duration are preferable. See
Borough of W. Caldwell, 138 A.2d at 412-13;
Farley, 227 N.W.2d at 82; Kovachik v. Am. Auto.
Ass'n, 5 Wis.2d 188, 92 N.W.2d 254, 256 (1958).
Because the law disfavors contracts of perpetual
performance or duration, courts will interpret a
contract as being of indefinite duration only where
the parties to the contract have clearly and
unambiguously indicated their intentions to create a
contract of indefinite duration through the use of
Copr. © West 2004 No Claim

express and positive language to that effect in the
contract. [FN2] See *U74William B. Tanner Co.,
716 F.2d at 1159 ("Courts are reluctant to interpret
contracts providing for some perpetual or unlimited
contractual right unless the contract clearly states
that that is the intention of the parties.");
Mid-Southern Toyota, Ltd. v. Bug's Imps., Inc., 453
S.W.2d 544, 549 (Ky.1970) ("The general rule is
that a construction conferring a right in perpetuity
will be avoided unless compelled by the
unequivocal language of the contract."); Paisley,
143 S.W.2d at 271 ("A contract [for employment]
for life will be upheld only where the intention, that
the contract's duration is for life, is clearly
expressed in unequivocal terms."); Borough of W.
Caldwell, 138 A.2d at 412-13 ("[A] construction
affirming a [contractual performance] right in
perpetuity is to be avoided unless given in clear and
peremptory terms," and "[i]t is not often that a
promise will properly be interpreted as calling for
perpetual
performance"
(internal
quotations
omitted)); 17B C.J.S. Contracts § 439 (1999) ("[A]
construction conferring a right in perpetuity will be
avoided unless compelled by the unequivocal
language of the contract [and] a contract which
purports to run in perpetuity must be adamantly
clear that that is the parties' intent, in order to be
enforceable."). Likewise, employment contracts
that do not explicitly express the parties' intentions
that the contract be for lifetime or permanent
employment have been held to be unenforceable or
merely terminable at the will of either party. See
Chastain v. Kelly-Springfield Tire Co., 733 F.2d
1479, 1482, 1484 (11th Cir.1984); Littell v.
Evening Star Newspaper Co., 120 F.2d 36, 37
(D.C.Cir.1941); 30 C.J.S. Employer-Employee
Relationship § 23 (1992).

FN2. The majority opinion notes that the
parties have not argued in their appellate
briefs that a term should be implied into
the contract and that both parties contend
that the contract should be evaluated as an
indefinite-length contract limited only by
the just cause provision. This incorrectly
elevates the parties' arguments in the briefs
to the level of an agreement between the
parties on this point and treats it as a
stipulation. Nothing in the record or the
briefs indicates that the parties have
stipulated in the manner the majority
Orig. U.S. Govt. Works
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opinion claims. The parties do not deny
that they did not include an explicit
provision in the contract expressing their
intentions
purposely
to
create
an
indefinite- length contract. If the parties
to a contract intend to create an
indefinite-length
contract, they must
express their intentions to do so through
clear, unambiguous, and unequivocal
language in the contract. The parties'
questionable "concession" in this regard in
their briefs on appeal obviously fails to
meet this standard and is contrary to the
rule of law stated in the cited authority.
Both Johnson and Shah may recognize the
rights
of
parties
to
enter
into
indefinite-length contracts, but they do not
dispute or contradict the requirement that
the parties do so using explicit language in
their contract.
In any event, under normal circumstances,
we will treat particular facts or issues as
stipulated to by the parties only where such
a stipulation is clear and expressed.
Rarely, if ever, do we find a stipulation of
this nature by implication. The notion of
an implied stipulation is contrary to the
very nature of a stipulation as a clear,
definite, and certain agreement by the
parties as to the truth or validity of a
particular fact.
Finally, the majority
opinion
also
admonishes the dissent that "[i]n the
absence of adequate briefing, it would be
ill-advised for the court to raise [the issue
of implying a reasonable term] sua sponte,
especially [where] this issue presents a
question of first impression." This,
however, ignores our settled position that
this court has inherent authority to
consider arguments and issues that the
parties have not raised or recognized if it is
necessary to a proper decision and to avoid
bad law. See Kaiserman Assocs., Inc. v.
Francis Town, 977 P.2d 462, 464 (Utah
1998) ("[A]n overlooked or abandoned
argument should not compel an erroneous
result [and][w]e should not be forced to
ignore the law just because the parties have
not
raised
or
pursued
obvious
arguments."). Simply because the parties
did not recognize the issue on appeal or

because they are in supposed agreement in
their argumentative position, erroneous as
it may be, on appeal, we will not ignore a
genuine legal issue or acquiesce in the
parties' error and apply incorrect legal
principles.

f 32 Where a contract is of indefinite or perpetual
duration because of the lack of an explicit term, the
law will imply into the contract a term that is
reasonable
under
the
circumstances.
See
McCauliff, 8 Corbin on Contracts § 34.11, at 262;
see also Metal Assocs., Inc., 165 F.2d at 165;
Consol Theatres, Inc., 73 Cal.Rptr. 213, 447 P.2d
at 335; Brown Loan & Abstract Co., 102 S.E. at
815; Anne Arundel County v. Crofton Corp., 286
Md. 666, 410 A.2d 228, 232 (1980);
Ansbacher-Siegle Corp., 288 N.W. at 541; Tavel,
535 P.2d at 1288; Borough of W. Caldwell, 138
A.2d at 412-13; Erskine v. Chevrolet Motors Co.,
185 N.C. 479, 117 S.E. 706, 713-14 (1923); Harris
v. Ohio Oil Co., 57 Ohio St. 118, 48 N.E. 502, 505
(1897); Hall, 308 S.W.2d at 15; Farley, 227
N.W.2d at 82; 17A Am.Jur.2d Contracts § 546
(1991); 27 Am.Jur.2d Employment Relationship §
38 (1996) (citing Shah, 655 S.W.2d 489); 17B
C.J.S. Contracts § 421 (1999); Kniffin, 5 Corbin on
Contracts § 24.29.
\ 33 The majority opinion criticizes this dissent
for its lack of citation to Utah precedent in support
of determining and implying a reasonable term of
duration into the contract. This is empty criticism
given that this case presents an issue of first
impression in this jurisdiction.
\ 34 The majority opinion incorrectly relies on
Berube v. Fashion Centre, Ltd., Ill P.2d 1033
(Utah 1989), Brehany v. Nordstrom, Inc., 812 P.2d
49 (Utah 1991), and Johnson v. Morton Thiokol,
Inc., 818 P.2d 997 (Utah 1991), as binding Utah
authority that purportedly rejects the dissent's
approach in this case. While the majority is correct
in noting "that nothing in Johnson, Brehany, or
Berube suggests that a court should sua sponte
impose a term on an indefinite-length employment
contract that provides for termination for cause,"
nothing in those decisions *1175 would prohibit the
implication of a reasonable term into the contract
either. Those cases simply do not go as far as
articulating a governing rule applicable to the case

Copr. © West 2004 No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works

Page 12

54P.3d 1165
19 IER Cases 9,455 Utah Adv. Rep. 36, 2002 UT 92
(Cite as: 54 P.3d 1165)
at hand and are focused on a separate and discrete
issue not present in the instant case.
If 35 Specifically, the majority opinion's assertion
that in Berube we noted (and purportedly endorsed)
the notion that "courts long ago repudiated a
common law rule under which a term was implied
when an employment contract did not specify a
duration" is not entirely correct and overstates
Berube. The central issue in Berube was whether
the termination-related provisions of an employer's
employee handbook could be implied into the
employment contract as implied-in-fact contract
terms between the employer and employee such that
the original indefinite-length employment contract
would escape application of the "at-will"
employment
doctrine
that
provides
an
indefinite-length employment contract is terminable
by either party for good cause, cause, or no cause at
all.
| 36 In the "historical development" portion of
Justice Durham's plurality opinion in Berube, to
which the majority opinion in this case cites, Justice
Durham merely traced the historical development
and adoption of the "at-will" employment doctrine
in the United States.
Tf 37 In any event, that section of Berube does not
stand for the proposition offered by the majority
opinion. The historical review section of the
Berube plurality opinion simply described the
nineteenth century English common law rule stating
that English courts, when faced with employment
contracts of indefinite duration, would imply an
arbitrary one-year term into the contract. Berube,
111 P.2d at 1040-41; see also McCauliff, 8 Corbin
on Contracts § 3 4.11, at 257. Berube 's historical
review merely noted that American courts rejected
the arbitrary one-year term implied by English
courts in favor of the "at-will" employment
doctrine. Berube, 111 P.2d at 1040- 41. Berube
simply acknowledged the historical rejection of the
implication of a term of duration in an "at-will"
employment contract. See id. It does not, as the
majority opinion claims, reject the notion that a
reasonable term could or should be implied into an
employment contract that is by its own terms
outside the "at-will" employment doctrine because
of a just cause provision such that the parties are
bound for a "reasonable time." See McCauliff, 8
Corbin on Contracts § 34.11, at 262. In fact,

Justice Durham's opinion in Berube notes that the
rejection of the English common law implied
one-year term and the adoption of the "at-will"
employment doctrine in the United States was
"adopted by many jurisdictions without careful or
thorough examination." Berube, 111 P.2d at 1040.
Thus, the most Berube can be cited for in this
regard is the proposition that American courts
uncritically rejected the arbitrary one-year implied
term rule used by the English courts, but not the
apparently unconsidered, yet supportable, notion
that a reasonable term could or should be implied
into an indefinite-length employment contract that
by its own terms is not terminable at will. See
McCauliff, 8 Corbin on Contracts § 34.11, at 262.
Therefore, the majority opinion's statement in
applying purportedly controlling Utah precedent to
this case that "[w]e do not apply the long-since
rejected rule that previously required the
implication of a term" is based on a
misinterpretation of Berube 's historical review.
Regardless, this portion of the plurality Berube
opinion, despite being joined by a majority of the
court, was at best dicta in that it was historical
exposition. Berube and its progeny simply do not
prohibit the implication of a reasonable term into
the contract at hand and are not binding precedent
that govern whether a term of duration should be
implied into the contract at issue.
^f 38 Finally, Johnson and Brehany likewise do
not govern the present case or bar the imposition of
an implied reasonable term of duration into the
contract. Brehany and Johnson, like Berube, were
employee handbook or implied-in-fact contract term
cases but go no further than Berube in their
holdings and no more state an on-point or
governing rule applicable in this case than does
Berube.
If 39 Berube, Brehany, and Johnson all involved
indefinite- length employment contracts and claims
of wrongful termination. *1176 However, these
cases merely explore and set rules for determining
whether a plaintiff employee's claim for wrongful
termination can escape the general "at-will"
employment doctrine. In other words, in those
cases, this court was asked to determine whether an
implied-in-fact term existed which would remove
the contract from the general "at-will" employment
doctrine under which a plaintiff employee could not
sustain a wrongful termination action. If such an
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implied-in-fact term was found to exist, for example
where an employer's employee handbook specified
exclusive reasons for termination of its employees,
then those provisions of the employment handbook
were treated as implied-in-fact contract terms,
removing the employment contract from the "atwill" employment doctrine rules and preventing the
employer from terminating the contract for any or
no cause.
T[ 40 The case at hand involves an
indefinite-length contract which contained an
express "just cause" provision. Because that
provision was expressed, the analysis and rules in
Berube, Brehany, and Johnson are not applicable;
we already know that the express "just cause"
provision takes us out of the general "at-will"
employment doctrine rule. The issue here is how
the trial court is to determine whether the duration
of the contract is reasonable and how it is to arrive
at such a reasonable duration. This is a question
not previously addressed to this court and to which
Berube, B rehany, and Johnson are not instructive.
The legal propositions and rules of contract
construction and interpretation presented in this
dissent are more appropriate for use by the trial
court in adjudicating this controversy on remand.
| 41 Once the trial court determines the
reasonable term under the circumstances and that
term is implied by law into the contract, the contract
will necessarily be enforceable against the
succeeding board under the second prong of the Bair
test articulated in the majority opinion because (1)
the activity contracted for is proprietary and (2) the
term or duration that was implied into the contract
is de facto reasonable under the circumstances.
| 42 Having determined the reasonable duration
of the contract, and therefore its enforceability, the
trial court must then determine if the hospital
breached the contract when it terminated Dr. Hardy.
It could terminate him before the expiration of the
implied term only for "just cause." If the trial court
determines that the hospital had just cause to
terminate the contract with Dr. Hardy, the hospital
did not breach the contract and Dr. Hardy is not
entitled to damages. If the trial court determines
that the hospital did not have just cause to terminate
the contract with Dr. Hardy, then the hospital
breached the contract and Dr. Hardy is entitled to
damages calculated consistent with the reasonable

employment duration term implied into the contract.
See Bad Wound v. Lakota Cmty. Homes, Inc.,
1999 SD 165, T[ 11, 603 N.W.2d 723, 726.
U 43 Under the majority opinion's analysis, Dr.
Hardy's damages, assuming the hospital is liable to
Dr. Hardy for terminating him without just cause,
would be speculative, at best, and undeterminable,
at worst, absent a finite term of duration in the
contract. See Benham v. World Airways, Inc., 432
F.2d 359, 360, 361-62 (9th Cir.1970); Sterling
Drug, Inc. v. Oxford, 294 Ark. 239, 743 S.W.2d
380, 386-87 (1988). It is for this reason that the
law disfavors contracts of perpetual duration and
why, when faced with contracts of indefinite
duration, courts will imply a reasonable term of
duration. If on remand the perpetual contract is
held to be enforceable and the trial court determines
that the hospital did not have just cause to terminate
the contract, how would Dr. Hardy's damages be
calculated? Would Dr. Hardy be entitled to all of
his loss of earnings under the indefinite contract?
In other words, would he be entitled to
compensation under the contract from the date of
termination to the date of his death? To the date of
his retirement? To the date of his inability to
perform his job responsibilities, whenever that
might be? Determining a reasonable term for the
contract under the circumstances and implying it
into the contract would avoid the possibility of
speculative or undeterminable damages.
*1177 If 44 The majority opinion disagrees that
imposition of a definite term is justified and argues
that the trial court would face similar "challenges"
in determining a reasonable term of duration under
the circumstances as it would in determining Dr.
Hardy's speculative damages. The approach
advocated in this dissent would focus the trial
court's attention and efforts on the discrete task of
discerning a reasonable term for the contract under
the circumstances, thus centering the inquiry on the
parties' intentions, the nature of the parties'
relationship, and the overall circumstances
surrounding the formation of the contract at issue.
See McCauliff, 8 Corbin on Contracts § 34.11, at
262. The majority opinion's suggestion for
determining Dr. Hardy's potential damages would
take the trial court's attention away from the
contract itself and the context in which it was
formulated and focus on myriad distant and less
related factors, all of which remain at least to some

Copr. © West 2004 No Claim • Orig. U.S. Govt. Works

54P.3d 1165
19 IER Cases 9,455 Utah Adv. Rep. 36, 2002 UT 92
(Cite as: 54 P.3d 1165)
extent speculative in nature. I would not send the
trial court into the majority opinion's briar patch of
thorny factors. In this case, [FN3] it would be far
less complicated and less speculative for the trial
court to determine Dr. Hardy's potential damages in
relation to an implied reasonable term.

FN3. The majority opinion also argues that
under the dissent's analysis courts will
"inevitably and routinely need to determine
damages associated with a breach of an
indefinite employment contract." This is
incorrect. The vast majority of cases
involving issues of termination under
indefinite-length
employment
contracts
will be governed by the "at- will"
employment doctrine. In those instances,
the issue of damages would not arise
because the employment relationship
would be terminable by either party for
any reason. The problematic issue of
damages arises only in the very rare and
unique case, such as the one at hand, where
an expressed or implied "just cause" term
is a part of the indefinite duration contract,
thus removing the case from the
application
of
the
usual
"at-will"
employment doctrine rule.

K 45 I would remand to the trial court but with
instructions consistent with this concurring opinion.
f 46 Justice HOWE concurs in Justice RUSSON's
concurring and dissenting opinion.
54 P.3d 1165, 19 IER Cases 9, 455 Utah Adv. Rep.
36, 2002 UT 92
END OF DOCUMENT
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IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR DUCHESNE COUNTY, ROOSEVELT DEPARTMENT, STATE OF UTAH
UINTAH BASIN MEDICAL CENTER,

RULING

Plaintiff,
vs.
Case No. 990000109
LEO W. HARDY, M.D.,
Defendant.

Judge John R. Anderson

LEO W. HARDY, M.D.,
Counterclaimant and
Third-Party Plaintiff,
I/O

Vo.

UINTAH BASIN MEDICAL CENTER,
Counterclaim Defendant
and Third-Party Defendant.

The Court having received plaintiffs Post-Remand Motion for Summary Judgment, or in
the Alternative, Rule 42 Motion to Bifurcate, defendant's Opposition to Plaintiffs Post-Remand
Motion for Summary Judgment, and plaintiffs Reply Memorandum, having received argument,
reviewed the pleadings, and being otherwise fully informed enters the following:
The issue before the Court is whether Dr. Hardy's contract was of a reasonable duration
and therefore enforceable, and if the contract is enforceable, whether just cause existed pursuant
to the contract to terminate Dr. Hardy. Based upon the following, the Court does not need to
reach the latter issue.
As instructed by the Utah Supreme Court in Uintah Basin Medical Center v. Hardy, 54
P.3d 1165 (Utah 2002), the Court must first interpret the intended scope of the just cause
provision to determine the reasonableness of the duration of the contract. It is proper for the
Court to make this determination at this time due to the determihation of the scope of the

contractual just cause clause being a question of law as a matter of contract interpretation. See
Uintah Basin Medical Center v. Hardy, 54 P.3d 1165, 1169 Fn3 (quoting Miller v. USAACas.
Ins. Co., 44 P.3d 663 (Utah, 2002)). As suggested by the Utah Supreme Court, if the just cause
provision is broad in its discretion to subsequent boards, then the contract should be found to be
of a reasonable duration. Conversely, if the intended scope of the just cause pro/vision is
limiting on successor boards, the contract is unreasonable and should not be enforced.
It is apparent from the record established before the Court, that at the time of executing
the contract Dr. Hardy believed the just cause clause to mean that he could only be terminated for
a few specific reasons, including death, physical incapacity, or if the hospital no longer required
pathology services. See Deposition of Leo W. Hardy, M.D., July 26, 1999. Dr. Hardy did further
explain his position during the deposition to add that he felt as long as pathological services were
required by the hospital, Uintah Basin Medical Center was contractually obligated to continue
employing him. Dr. Hardy, through his declaration, has introduced a later interpretation of the
just cause clause as including other factors that could constitute just cause, inter alia, closure of
the hospital or elimination of pathological services. It is interesting to note that Dr. Hardy's
declaration was introduced after the Utah Supreme Court issued their ruling on this matter. It
appears Dr. Hardy has attempted to re-draft his interpretation of the just cause clause to more
similarly mirror the higher Court's opinion. As counsel for plaintiff correctly noted, when Dr.
Hardy took a clear position during his deposition, which was not modified on cross-examination,
the later definition raised by Dr. Hardy through his declaration cannot be relied upon. Therefore,
it appears that Dr. Hardy's position taken at his deposition truly represents his understanding of
the intended scope of the just cause clause at the time the contract was executed. Given Dr.
Hardy's understanding of the intended scope of the just cause clause in light of the Utah Supreme
Court's opinion, the contract offered little discretion to successor boards. As such, the contract
cannot be viewed as including a reasonable duration.
When comparing Dr. Hardy's contract to those typically entered into by Uintah Basin
Medical Center with other medical professionals, it becomes even more apparent that Dr.
Hardy's contract was unreasonable. As exhibit G to plaintiffs Memorandum in Support of PostRemand Motion for Summary Judgment clearly indicates, Dr. Hardy's contract was unusual in
the sense that no time duration was included in the contract, nor did his contract contain the
typical provision providing either party the right to terminate the contract at any time after giving
the appropriate notice. Dr. Hardy's argument that he was a hospital-based physician and
therefore could not initiate his own income, but was referred work by other physicians is not well
taken. Comparison of Dr. Hardy's contract to other similarly situated hospital-based physicians,
such as surgeons, shows that his contract was still unusual in not providing a specific time
limitation on the contract and the provision allowing either party to terminate the contract given
the appropriate notice period. There is sufficient evidence before the Court to make this
determination through comparison of Dr. Hardy's contract to those included in plaintiffs exhibit
G. Although Dr. Stewart's contract is also atypical in that it contains specific conditions
regarding when termination can occur, it does not refute the fact that when comparing Dr.
Hardy's contract to other medical professionals typically entered into by Uintah Basin Medical

Center, the vast majority of those contracts provide a specific duration, and a provision allowing
either party to terminate the contract after giving the appropriate notice. Additionally, the fact
that Uintah Basin Medical Center entered into such a dissimilar contract with Dr. Hardy bolsters
the idea that the intended scope of the just cause clause in the contract limited successor boards'
discretion in terminating Dr. Hardy as noted above. Obviously, failure to include a provision that
allowed termination by either party after appropriate notice in the contract limits successor
boards ability to terminate Dr. Hardy. This fact, along with the unusual nature of the contract,
and Dr. Hardy's own statement as to the intended scope of the just cause clause, lead the Court to
the inevitable conclusion that the contract's just cause clause unreasonably limited the discretion
of successor boards and is therefore of an unreasonable duration. As such, as Justice Durrant's
opinion indicates, the Court must find the contract is unenforceable.
Because the Court concludes the intended scope of the just cause clause provided limited
discretion to future boards, and is unusual when comparing Dr. Hardy's contract to other
contracts typically entered into by Uintah Basin Medical Center with other medical professionals,
and as such the contracts duration was unreasonable making the contract unenforceable, the
Court does not need to determine whether or not just cause existed under the contract to
terminate Dr. Hardy.
Based upon the above, it is hereby ORDERED plaintiff's Post-Remand Motion for
Summary Judgment is GRANTED.
Dated this / ^ " d a y of June, 2003.
BY
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JOHN P. HARRINGTON (5242)
HOLLAND & HART LLP

60 E. South Temple, Suite 2000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-1031
Telephone: (801) 595-7800
Facsimile: (801) 364-9124
SARAH M. BTRKELAND (9495)
RAY QUINNEY & NEBEKER

36 South State Street, Suite 1400
P.O. Box 45385
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0385
Telephone: (801) 532-1500
Attorneys for Defendant Leo W. Hardy, M.D.
IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF DUCHESNE COUNTY,
ROOSEVELT DIVISION, STATE OF UTAH
UINTAH BASIN MEDICAL CENTER,
Plaintiff,

DECLARATION OF
LEO W. HARDY, M.D.

v.
LEO W. HARDY, M.D.,

Trial Court No. 990000109CV
Defendant.
Judge John R. Anderson

LEO W. HARDY, M.D.,
Counterclaimant and
Third-Party Plaintiff,
V.

UTNTAH BASIN MEDICAL CENTER and
THOMAS J. ALLRED, M.D.,
Counterclaim Defendants
and Third-Party Defendants.
STATE OF UTAH
SS.
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE
I, Leo W. Hardy, M.D., being over twenty-one years of age and of sound mind,
declare and state under the penalties of perjury as follows:

1.

After the completion of my pathology residency in June, 1994, I have

worked with Dr. Joseph Sannella, M.D., a pathologist who provided pathology services
to various rural hospitals. Dr. Sannella was preparing to retire and introduced me to
various physicians and administrators associated with those rural hospitals in anticipation
of my assuming the duties of Dr. Sannella..
2.

I was introduced to the Uintah Basin Medical Center ("UBMC") (then

known as Duchesne County Hospital) by Dr. Sannella. Dr. Sannella indicated to UBMC
that I was capable of providing the pathology services for UBMC on a similar basis as
Dr. Sannella, which included, among other things, providing anatomic and clinical
pathology services, an in-person weekly visit to UBMC, medical directorship of the
UBMC lab, consultations with UBMC physicians, etc.
3.

Joe Hockett, the lab supervisor at UBMC, indicated that UBMC would

like to enter into a contract with me regarding my providing pathology services to
UBMC. Mr. Hockett gave me a copy of Dr. Sannella's contract with UBMC dated
September 21, 1992 ("Dr. Sannella's Contract").

Paragraph 11 of Dr. Sannella's

Contract had a "just cause" provision: ". . . until terminated after ninety (90) days written
notice for just cause of termination by either party or by mutual consent of the parties to a
shorter notice period." I used Dr. Sannella's contract as a template for my own contract
and the "just cause" provision of Paragraph 11 remained. Attached hereto as Exhibit "A"
is a copy of Dr. Sannella's Contract with my handwritten revisions. I gave the copy of
Dr. Sannella's contract with my revisions to Mr. Hockett who then had the contract typed
on the letterhead of Duchesne County Hospital. Mr. Bradley LeBaron reviewed and
signed the contract. Attached hereto as Exhibit "B" is a copy of my contract with UBMC
dated November 29, 1994 (the "Agreement").
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4.

At the time that I entered into the Agreement with UBMC, I was

concerned about the duration of the contract. If I was going to commit a considerable
amount of time and professional resources to service the pathology needs of UBMC and
its physicians and patients, then I wanted a secure contract that would allow me to
perform the required pathology services and to appropriately expand my services and
meet any potential increased demands of UBMC. If UBMC experienced increased need
for pathology services, I wanted to expand and invest in my practice to accommodate
those increased needs. Therefore, so long as I was capable of performing the best quality
pathology services to all patients, I needed the contractual commitment of UBMC that
they would not terminate the Agreement for any indiscriminate reason. Knowing that
UBMC had made that same commitment to Dr. Sannella, I included the "just cause"
provision in the Agreement and foresaw no reason that UBMC would not honor their
contractual commitment to me.
5.

Pursuant to the Agreement, UBMC would be permitted to terminate the

Agreement upon the occurrence of "just cause". Just cause would occur if I was unable
to perform my duties as a pathologist for UBMC. If I was physically unable to perform
(e.g., death, disability, old age, etc.), then UBMC would certainly be able to terminate the
Agreement.

If my performance was less than satisfactory (e.g., professional

incompetency or inability to get along with the UBMC physicians), then just cause would
have occurred.

Certainly the loss of my Utah Medical license or sanctions by an

appropriate regulatory body would constitute just cause.
6.

There are other circumstances that would constitute just cause that are

unrelated to my performance as a pathologist. If the Duchesne County Commissioners
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decided to close UBMC, then the UBMC Board of Trustees would have just cause to
temiinate the Agreement. If the Duchesne County Commissioners materially changed
the nature of the hospital whereby pathology services were not needed, then my
Agreement could be terminated. For example, if UBMC no longer performed surgery or
other medical procedures that require pathology services, then my Agreement could be
terminated. But while UBMC had any need for pathology services, UBMC contractually
agreed that I was the medical doctor to perform those services. It is very hard to imagine
the medical specialty of pathology being eliminated or no longer needed, but if that
happened, then UBMC could temiinate my Agreement. If UBMC perceived a need for
changes in scope or manner of the provided pathology services, I expected them to
approach me regarding such a need, and if jointly agreed upon, I would have adjusted
accordingly. If I could not accommodate these changes, then UBMC would be free to
temiinate the Agreement, hi essence, UBMC would have just cause to terminate my
Agreement if I failed to perform or something substantial changed as to the need of
UBMC for pathology services (e.g., hospital closure) which may be caused by financial
concerns. Those financial concerns, however, could not include merely getting a lower
price for the pathology services or histology lab supervision. The financial concerns
would have to be of such magnitude that the governmental policy-making function of the
Duchesne County Commissioners would be involved (e.g., hospital closure).
7.

UBMC could not terminate my Agreement to hire another pathologist

while I was providing UBMC with the level of satisfactory pathology services that I was.
Prior to the decision of the UBMC Board of Trustees made on July 18, 1996, there was
no indication whatsoever that my pathology services were inadequate or unsatisfactory.
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hi fact, UBMC physicians had continually praised my performance. I have been shown
no evidence that financial considerations entered into UBMC's decision to terminate my
Agreement. UBMC never discussed any financial concerns with my Agreement or the
cost of the pathology services I was providing. As to UBMC's alleged desire to have an
on-site resident pathologist, Brad LeBaron did not discuss that issue with me or request
that I move to Roosevelt, Utah. There is no question in my mind that UBMC did not
have sufficient needs for a full time pathologist. The quantity and quality of pathology
services I was providing the physicians at UBMC met all of their needs at a nationally
comparable and cost-effective price.
8.

If UBMC had need of pathology services that I could not provide them,

then UBMC would have just cause to terminate my Agreement. However, UBMC did
not have any pathology service needs that I could not provide in a timely and efficient
manner, nor did they have any perceived needs for services on-site or other services that I
could not meet. As to their alleged desire to have an on-site pathologist who lived in
Roosevelt, they never presented me with an opportunity to meet that desire.
Dated this _/£_J day of April, 2003.

Leo W. Hara
STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

)
:ss
)

Subscribed and sworn to before me this

day of April, 2003.

Notary Public
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IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR DUCHESNE COUNTY,
ROOSEVELT DIVISION, STATE OF UTAH
UINTAH BASIN MEDICAL CENTER,
Plaintiff,

FINAL ORDER FOR ENTRY
OF JUDGMENT

LEO W. HARDY, M.D.

Civil No. 990000109 CV
Judge John R. Anderson
(Declaratory Judgment Action)

v.

Defendant.
LEO W. HARDY, M.D.,
Counterclaimant and
Third-Party Plaintiff,
V.

UINTAH BASIN MEDICAL CENTER
and THOMAS J. ALLRED, M.D.
Counterclaim Defendant
and Third-Party Defendant.

#148768 vl

For the reasons set forth in the Court's Ruling Granting Plaintiffs Post Remand Motion
for Summary Judgment, dated June 19, 2003, attached hereto, Defendant's counterclaims are
dismissed with prejudice and Plaintiffs claim for declaratory relief is granted.
DATED this JOV-day of^JAWl

^ , 2003.

Ion. John R. Anderson
/District Court Judge

APPROVED AS TO FORM:
HOLLAND & HART

*

&

JcftinfP. Haitiflgton
Attorney for Defendant

#148768 vl
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the 26th day of June, 2003, I caused to be hand delivered a true
and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER FOR ENTRY OF JUDGMENT to the following:
John P. Harrington, Esq.
HOLLAND & HART
60 East South Temple, Suite 2000
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
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IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR DUCHESNE COUNTY, ROOSEVELT DEPARTMENT, STATE OF UTAH
UINTAH BASIN MEDICAL CENTER,

RULING

Plaintiff,
vs.
Case No. 990000109
LEO W. HARDY, M.D.,
Defendant.

«

Judge John R. Anderson

LEOW HARDY, M D ,
Counterclaim ant and
Third-Party Plaintiff,
Vb.

UINTAH BASIN MEDICAL CENTER,
Counterclaim Defendant
and Third-Party Defendant.

The Court having received plaintiffs Post-Remand Motion for Summary Judgment, or in
the Alternative, Rule 42 Motion to Bifurcate, defendant's Opposition to Plaintiffs Post-Remand
Motion for Summary Judgment, and plaintiffs Reply Memorandum, having received argument,
reviewed the pleadings, and being otherwise fully informed enters the following:
The issue before the Court is whether Dr. Hardy's contract was of a reasonable duration
and therefore enforceable, and if the contract is enforceable, whether just cause existed pursuant
to the contract to terminate Dr. Hardy. Based upon the following, the Court does not need to
reach the latter issue.
As instructed by the Utah Supreme Court in Uintah Basin Medical Center v. Hardy, 54
P. 3d 1165 (Utah 2002), the Court must first interpret the intended scope of the just cause
provision to determine the reasonableness of the duration of the contract. It is proper for the
Court to make this determination at this time due to the determination of the scope of the

contractual just cause clause being a question of law as a matter of contract interpretation. See
Uintah Basin Medical Center v. Hardy, 54 P.3d 1165, 1169 Fn3 (quoting Miller v. USAACas.
Ins, Co., 44 P.3d 663 (Utah, 2002)). As suggested by the Utah Supreme Court, if the just cause
provision is broad in its discretion to subsequent boards, then the contract should be found to be
of a reasonable duration. Conversely, if the intended scope of the just cause pro/vision is
limiting on successor boards, the contract is unreasonable and should not be enforced.
It is apparent from the record established before the Court, that at the time of executing
the contract Dr. Hardy believed the just cause clause to mean that he could only be terminated for
a few specific reasons, including death, physical incapacity, or if the hospital no longer required
pathology services. See Deposition of Leo W. Hardy, M.D., July 26, 1999. Dr. Hardy did further
explain his position during the deposition to add that he felt as long as pathological services were
required by the hospital, Uintah Basin Medical Center was contractually obligated to continue
employing him. Dr. Hardy, through his declaration, has introduced a later interpretation of the
just cause clause as including other factors that could constitute just cause, inter alia, closure of
the hospital or elimination of pathological services. It is interesting to note that Dr. Hardy's
declaration was introduced after the Utah Supreme Court issued their ruling on this matter. It
appears Dr. Hardy has attempted to re-draft his interpretation of the just cause clause to more
similarly mirror the higher Court's opinion. As counsel for plaintiff correctly noted, when Dr.
Hardy took a clear position during his deposition, which was not modified on cross-examination,
the later definition raised by Dr. Hardy through his declaration cannot be relied upon. Therefore,
it appears that Dr. Hardy's position taken at his deposition truly represents his understanding of
the intended scope of the just cause clause at the time the contract was executed. Given Dr.
Hardy's understanding of the intended scope of the just cause clause in light of the Utah Supreme
Court's opinion, the contract offered little discretion to successor boards. As such, the contract
cannot be viewed as including a reasonable duration.
When comparing Dr. Hardy's contract to those typically entered into by Uintah Basin
Medical Center with other medical professionals, it becomes even more apparent that Dr.
Hardy's contract was unreasonable. As exhibit G to plaintiffs Memorandum in Support of PostRemand Motion for Summary Judgment clearly indicates, Dr. Hardy's contract was unusual in
the sense that no time duration was included in the contract, nor did his contract contain the
typical provision providing either party the right to terminate the contract at any time after giving
the appropriate notice. Dr. Hardy's argument that he was a hospital-based physician and
therefore could not initiate his own income, but was referred work by other physicians is not well
taken. Comparison of Dr. Hardy's contract to other similarly situated hospital-based physicians,
such as surgeons, shows that his contract was still unusual in not providing a specific time
limitation on the contract and the provision allowing either party to terminate the contract given
the appropriate notice period. There is sufficient evidence before the Court to make this
determination through comparison of Dr. Hardy's contract to those included in plaintiffs exhibit
G. Although Dr. Stewart's contract is also atypical in that it contains specific conditions
regarding when termination can occur, it does not refute the fact that when comparing Dr.
Hardy's contract to other medical professionals typically entered into by Uintah Basin Medical

Center, the vast majority of those contracts provide a specific duration, and a provision allowing
either party to terminate the contract after giving the appropriate notice. Additionally, the fact
that Uintah Basin Medical Center entered into such a dissimilar contract with Dr. Hardy bolsters
the idea that the intended scope of the just cause clause in the contract limited successor boards'
discretion in terminating Dr. Hardy as noted above. Obviously, failure to include a provision that
allowed termination by either party after appropriate notice in the contract limits successor
boards ability to terminate Dr. Hardy. This fact, along with the unusual nature of the contract,
and Dr. Hardy's own statement as to the intended scope of the just cause clause, lead the Court to
the inevitable conclusion that the contract's just cause clause unreasonably limited the discretion
of successor boards and is therefore of an unreasonable duration. As such, as Justice Durrant's
opinion indicates, the Court must find the contract is unenforceable.
Because the Court concludes the intended scope of the just cause clause provided limited
discretion to future boards, and is unusual when comparing Dr. Hardy's contract to other
contracts typically entered into by Uintah Basin Medical Center with other medical professionals,
and as such the contracts duration was unreasonable making the contract unenforceable, the
Court does not need to determine whether or not just cause existed under the contract to
terminate Dr. Hardy.
Based upon the above, it is hereby ORDERED plaintiffs Post-Remand Motion for
Summary Judgment is GRANTED.
Dated this / ^ " d a y of June, 2003.

/0""
BY

TfflCQK]W:s)

John R. Anderson, District Court Judge
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We appreciate y *r response to our request to have .i formal agreement in handling our
Pathology need<. Listed below is the proposal submuied by you. I have reviewed this with
Joe Hokett and L iry Beck and have found that it meets the needsof Duchesne County
Hospital at this i me. Our agreement therefore includes the following1.
Dr Sannella agrees to personally visit the Duchesne County Hospital Lab
\vr:kly or wiJJ have another pathologist visit the hospital if he is unavailable.
2.
V i- its will not be substituted wi(h technologists Duration ol visit will be for
one to two hours devoted to the following activities:
a.
CAP proficiency survey reviews
b.
Review of Duchesne County Hospital QC program.
c.
Recommending processes to investigate technical and administrative
problems and advise adoption of policies and/or procedures for
correction.
e.
Develop liaison with all full time medical staff members to enable full
understanding of laboratory's role in supporting medical staffs mission.
Beginning in November, the pathologist will attend Medical Staff
meetings eveqrothag month— This meeting will be considered that
u
week's laboratory visit.
QL
^^
3.
Th* visiting pathologist will be available to tne medical staff for help with
interpretation of laboratory results. This would be a physician to physician
consult.
4.
Tht visiting pathologist will be available for more complex consultations, bone
mairow biopsies, pe^^ai^ggEfaieedk-bioyiWi of lui^etfuor fine needle
asp ation biopsy of superficial masses (i.e., breast, thyroid, lymph node).
Pro' edures in these categories will be direct patient services and will be billed
as such.
5.
The visiting pathologist will also undertake teaching activities for both medical
staff and laboratory staff when new procedures are to be introduced
6.
Every opportunity to educate laboratory staff in those areas where new
r

l

DEPOSITION
EXHIBIT
-s

uu^newnu vouniy im»H

ai

information or t! need for better understanding of the need for clinical
consultation, wili be pursued.
7.
As Laboratory D rector, I will take responsibility for continued CAP
accreditation, inc tiding interim self-inspection, review of manuals, and all
activities CAP h: : identified as Laboratory Director responsibilities.
8.
DCH is permitte to formally register me with the State of Utah and CAP as
laboratory Dire; r, and inclusion of my name on any and all laboratory
reports, thus doc men ting my medicolegal relationship^ with thfe^DCH
Laboratory.
,
"""7)
9.
DCH will pay a . -boratory Director's fee oK$400.00 per month/ This wttTES
JjiCFeased-to-SStX'. .00 per-montion suhsequent-yeafsr
"
10.
Ifan;[ wjierr. unr!-? separate, ag*eement/kll surgical pathology and extra-genital
cytology is re fen ci to the Laboratory Director's practice, additional activities
such as medical . -ff committee work, will be undertaken. These may include
Infection Control Tissue Reviews, .Surgical Case Review, Transfusion
Committee, or B! x>d utilization Review, and involvement in hospital-wide
ContinuingQualit Improvement.
/V?*^ ' / I ? ? V
11.
This agreement s* all become effective Qfitebcrt7T992 and continue to bind
the parties to the erms hereof until terminated after ninety (90) days written
notice for just ca^ se of termination by either party or by mutual consent of the
parties to a short- •- notice period.
Your signature below indicates >oin acceptance oJ the responsibilities, services and benefits
listed above.
Sincerely,

Administrator

Jo^hJLSainella, M.D., P.C
L.x^*>

<J2
<& •' (^l-^r^T
(^~r**T

'"^ --')
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AGREEMENT
lis agreement is entered into between DUCHESNE COUNTY HOSPITAL, herein "the hospital"
id a professional radiologist, Dr. Wayne T. Stewart
The hospital requires the radiology services in meeting the needs of hospital
atients and desires to contract with individuals and/or organizations to provide those
ervices. It is proposed that we contract with Dr. Wayne Thomas Stewart, a physician,
pecializing in the field of radiology, with his place of business being in Roosevelt, Utah,
r. Wayne Thomas Stewart represents and has demonstrated that he has the training and
xpertise to provide the needed radiology services, and to assist the hospital in the
drainistration of its radiology department, and in this agreement with Dr. Stewart, the
ospital is relying upon those qualifications. The parties have entered into and will now
perate under an agreement similar to that herein proposed. By this contract, the parties
esire to set forth the rights and obligations of each party, and the provisions hereof.
Therefore, inconsideration of the promises to each made, the parties do hereby agree:
(1)

The hospital will operate, maintain and administer the business of its

Radiology Department, including the hiring, discharge and scheduling of personnel;
the acquisition and maintenence of equipment, the acquisition of supplies, and all
other administrative functions of the department. Dr. Stewart will be consulted in
all of these matters.
(2)

Dr. Stewart will retain the position and title of "Director of Medical

Imaging", and will assume and discharge all responsibility for the medical operation
of the department, in keeping with the policies of the hospital, the rules and
regulations of the Medical Staff, and all applical laws and regulations.
(3)

Dr. Stewart agrees to act as consulant to the hospital administration in

management decisions concerning the department, and to employ his best efforts in
promoting the professional and economic integrity of the department.
(4)

Dr. Stewart agrees to provide radiological services as follows:
(a) Dr. Stewart shall provide in-house services at the hospital during
normal working hours, each day Monday through Friday of each week. In the
event Dr. Stewart leaves during the week, he shall provide emergency
coverage.
(b) In matters requiring Emergency Room interpretations, on weekends and
holidays, such interpretive services shall be provided when and if Dr.
Stewa t is available.
(c) The radiologist shall provide basic diagnostic services required for
t-hp rxrp

and examination of hospital patients, and subject to the availability

special diagnostic procedures as may be required oy the medical staff.
(5)

In consideration of the services to be rendered by the radiologist, the

hospital shall pay to Dr. Stewart, an amount equal to thirth (30) percent of the
gross hospital charges of x-ray,fluroscopy, plain and computed tomography, nuclear
medicine,and all other diagnostic imaging services or on the basis that Medicare
and or Medicaid will pay. Payment shall be made on a monthly basis, payable on
or before the 15th day^of the month.The amount to be charged for radiological
services shall be determined by the hospital upon consultation with Dr. Stewart.
For the first year (12 months) the hospital guarantees a minimum compensation of
$150, 000. The hospital also acknowledges Dr. Stewart's wishes to be reimbursed
on a fee - for - service basisin the future. Dr. Stewart will retain that option
and will inform the hospital of his intentions to exercise that option at least
three (3) months before that change of reimbursement would take effect.
(6)

The hospital shall furnish such equipment as it shall find, upon consultation

with Dr. Stewart, is necessary for the proper operation of the department, and
shall maintain said equipment in proper operating condition. The hospital shall
also furnish such film, chemicals, stationery, and janitorial and utility services
as are required for proper operation of the department.
(7)

The hospital shall provide space in the radiology department for the radiologi:

to render services required of him hereunder.
(8)

In the event of disagreement between the hospital administration and the

radiologist, over equipment or supplies, a three-man committee comprised of one
member of the hospital administration, one member of the hospital board and a
representative of Dr. Stewart or himself, shall meet to solve the disagreement.
(9)

It is understood by all parties that in the rendering of radiology or

consultation services, hereunder, Dr. Stewart is acting as an independent
contractor, practicing radiology

in all of its forms, as a sub specialty of

medicine. The hospital shall insist that there not be a conflict of interest.
The Hospital agrees that for the term of the contract, no radiologist except
Dr. Stewart or someone appointed by Dr. Stewart, shall render interpretations
on radiographs, fluroscopy, ultrasounds,plain and computed tomography, mamography,
nuclear medicine , or any other form of diagnostic imaging.
(10)

Dr. Stewart shall maintain adequate professional liability insurance as

required under the Medical Staff By-Laws of the hospital. The hospital likewise
agrees to maintain professional liability insurance covering the operation
of the department as herein required.

(11)

All applicable provisions of law and other rules and regulations of any and

all governmental authorities relating to licensure and regulation of physicians and
hospitals, and to the operation of the department shall be fully complied- with by
all parties hereto. In addition, the parties shall also operate and conduct the
department in accordance with the standards and recommendations of the Utah State
Department of Health, the by-laws of the hospital, the by-laws and rules and
regulations of the Nedical Staff as may be in effect from time to time.
(12)

The hospital shall grant to Dr. Stewart such staff priviledges in the hospital

as are available to other physicians, upon compliance by such physicians with rules
and regulations, and Medical Staff By-laws of the hospital.
(13)

It is understood and agreed that the priviledges herein granted to Dr. Stewart

are exclusive and may not be granted to other radiologists in accordance with hospital
rules and regulations.
(14)

It is understood and agreed

that this contract may be terminated for the

following conditions or in the following ways, only:
(a)for the loss of a liscence to practice in the State of Utah, or;
(b)for the conviction of a felony, or;
(c)by the mutual consent of both parties.
0-5)

This agreement constitutes the entire agreement between both parties, and no

other representatives or provisions of prior contracts shall be binding upon them.
(16)

Should either party default in performance of the terms hereof, the defaulting

party agrees to pay all costs of enforcement, including court costs and a reasonable
attorney fee.

(acknowledgements on the following page)

AMMENDMENT
(17) If this agreement is terminated by Wayne T. Stewart, M.D. a minimum of
ninety (90) days notice will be provided to the hospital in writing.

<r~>
Chad Evans, A d m i n i s t r a t o r

Kevin Van T a s s e l l , Chairman

Duchesene County H o s p i t a l

Duchesene County H o s p i t a l Board

fd

/Z^-li^-L

ck^Ltr^C

Wayne /£
Thomas Stewart, M.D.

June 24, 1986

Dated t h i s 6th day of June , 1986.

r^
Chad Evans, A d m i n i s t r a t o r

Kevin Van T a s s e l l , Chairman

Duchesne County H o s p i t a l

Duchesne County H o s p i t a l Board

Wayne' Thomas S t e w a r t , M.D.

AMMENDMENT

This Ammendment describes the Duchesne County Hospital's payment for all
professional radiological services to Dr. Wayne Stewart for 1992. This is an
amendment to the 1986 agreement between Dr. Stewart and Duchesne County
Hospital.
It is agreed that Dr. Stewart will be provided twenty three payments of
$17,397.30 beginning January 25, 1992 and on the 10th and 25th of each of the
following months through December 25, 1992 for a total compensation of
$400,000.
His performance will be at a level approximating his past practice and consistent
with other conditions called out in the 1986 original agreement between
Duchesne County Hospital and Dr. Stewart.
This commitment of Duchesne County Hospital is predicated on the assumption
and condition that the Radiology Department activity (procedures) will at least
approximate the 1992 departmental forecast and plan. If Duchesne County
Hospital or physician performance does not meet anticipated levels then the
original 1986 Agreement between Dr. Stewart and Duchesne County Hospital
will govern.
Dated this 15th day of January, 1992.

/ ' John R. ^ejfferies*, Administrator
L/buchesne County Hospital
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1

Q

So what could you do?

2

A

I could provide a service wherein

the

3

physicians that were not using my services outside of

4

the hospital would use them.

5

Q

Okay.

So you have a certain amount

6

physicians out there that aren't

7

affiliated with a hospital.

8
9

A
do.

of

necessarily

You would go and

--

I don't think there's really much I could

I think it's pretty much contingent on who is

10

there and what they are doing.

11

another surgeon, my volume goes up.

12

doing a disservice

13

they can't trust my diagnoses and those kind of

14

things, then they are going to actively

15

another pathologist.

16

Q

If they

recruited

Now, if I am

to my physicians and they feel

So you as a pathologist

can't

like

request

necessarily

17

generate more work, you're relying upon surgeons, for

18

the most part, requesting your

services?

19

A

Yes.

20

Q

I want to get back to Exhibit 4 before we

21

break for lunch.

You still have it in front of you.

22

This is the November 29, 1994 letter agreement

23

contract that's at issue in this lawsuit.

24

personally have an understanding

25

way.

or

Do you

-- let me ask

it this

What do you believe just cause means?
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A

That's easy.

That means that the terms of

the contract aren't being
Q

fulfilled.

Give me an example of something that

would consider to be just cause to terminate
contract.

Give me an example if you wanted

terminate the contract, what would be just

you

this
to

cause?

Give me an example of something UBMC would do or not
do that you would consider just cause if you were
looking to terminate the contract .
A

My answer is anything

being met,
Q

isn't

fulfilled.
So, for example, if they stopped paying

the laboratory director's
cause,

in here that

fee, that would be

you

just

right?

A

I'll

tell you what it would b e .

It would

to the detriment of the patients, the community,
physicians that I serve.

be

the

That's what it is.

Q

Okay.

A

That's my answer to that

Q

Does that answer tell me that just

question.

goes beyond the performance of the language

cause
in this

contract?
MR. HARRINGTON:
that.

I am going to object

If you want to characterize

to

it or if you want

to ask him a question, but he's answered your

question
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1

same thing?

2

Q

N o , I am not asking that question.

My

3

question was simply, it wasn't your creation.

4

existed in the contract you were given,

5

A

It

right?

I can't answer yes or no on that, because

if

6

that wouldn't have existed, I'm not going to tell you

7

I wouldn't have said that exactly the way it was

8

written or words very closely, worded that same way.

9
10

Q

It existed, though, right?

It's

in

Exhibit 3?

11

A

Y e s , it's here.

12

Q

That's the language,

13

A

Right.

14

Q

In your opinion, then, so long as both

right?

15

are performing

16

your belief that this contract, then, would

17

perpetually?

the provisions of the a g r e e m e n t , is it

18

A

What does perpetually

19

Q

Forever.

20

A

Yes.

21

sides

exist

mean?

I wouldn't have said it and I wouldn't

have signed it if I didn't believe it.

22

Q

Okay.

You gave me one example of what

23

would consider to be just cause for you to

24

it.

25

terminate the contract so I get an understanding

Give me an example of just cause

you

terminate

for UBMC to
of
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your interpretation of just cause.
A

Whatever terms that I don't m e e t .

Q

Okay.

You've heard several people

testify

in other depositions, and you have seen a lot of
writing and so forth during the course of this
litigation.

If UBMC believed that it was in their

best interest to have an on-site pathologist

and that

would better serve the community, is that just

cause

in your mind?
A

I don't believe they can breach a contract

to get another pathologist.
Q

That's what they did.

Well, the question w a s , if they believed

it

was in the best interest of UBMC and the community

to

have an on-site pathologist, is that just cause

to

terminate this one?
A

No.

Q

So they would be bound by this contract

even

though the
A

That isn't true.

It wasn't

in their

best

interest.
Q

No, the question was, if it was in their

best interest.
A

I am not speculating.

I am telling you it

wasn't in their best interest.
Q

I understand

that's your position.
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1

you.

I just want to make sure we get some clarity

2

the record on a couple of things.

3

One was a question that Mr. Benard

elicited

4

from you with respect to the just cause provision

5

your contract, and he asked you initially if the

6

contract was then perpetual.

Do you remember

A

Yes, I do.

8

Q

Now, if I give you a definition which

obtained from Webster's Collegiate Dictionary

in

that?

7

9

on

is

which

10

says perpetual means without end, is your contract

11

was your contract with UBMC without

end?

12

A

No.

13

Q

What would bring that contract

14

A

If I died or if I went blind or if I fell

15
16
17

or

to an end?

into a coma.
Q
contract

So in your understanding,

then, was

your

perpetual?

18

A

No.

19

Q

Let me go back and ask you a couple of

20

questions about the woman doctor you had hired

for a

21

very brief period of time.

22

termination of her working with you, that was done

23

the recommendation of counsel; is that

The separation or the
on

correct?

24

A

Yes.

25

Q

Now, there were some questions asked as to
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